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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
The performance of thc Portuguese economy since 1985
has been encouraging and a catching-up process in real
terms with the rest of the Community seems established.
Faster output growth has been brought about by a rapid
expansion of investment and exports. Employment cre-
ation has been substantial and the unemployment rate is
low by any standards.
Aware of the large gap in the level of economic develop-
ment compared with the EC average, the Portuguese
authorities have started a long-term policy of structural
adjustment helped by Community Funds. Modernization
and diversification of the industrial structures have
started, sustained by buoyant foreign direct investment
particularly in new, more technologically-advanced sec-
tors.
However, a number of concerns remain, stemming in
part from success achieved, Since 1988, inflation perfor-
manc€ remains at a level which is hardly compatible
with a successful participation of Portugal in the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism @RM). The acceleration of
inflation occured despite a favourable evolution of
wages and salaries, real wages increasing at a rate well
below productivity growth. The strength of domestic
demand, mainly via its impact on the relative price of
non-tradables, appears to have been one of the main
factors behind adverse price developments. Furthermore
monetary policy was made much less effective in
countering excess demand by the large capital inflows in
the last few years which the degree of financial inregra-
tion already achieved between Portugal and abroad made
possible. The pre-announced exchange-rate target
together with a decreasing risk-premium on Portuguese
assets and high nominal interest rates also strongly en-
couraged capital imports. This aggravated the difficul-
ties formonetary control, given the overliquid condition
of the banking system. In these conditions, a sharp rise
in food prices and the diffusion through the whole econ-
omy of wage increases in the tradeable sectors have
fuelled inflation.
The deficit of the current account has been relatively
modest until now; the large trade deficit - not least due
to the dynamism of investment - has been partially com-
pensated by the growing surplus on services and trans-
fers. Since 1988, the basic balance of Portugal has
recorded a large surplus as a result of long-term capital
inflows. The existing pattern of the external accounts
may be considered appropriate at the present stage of
development of Portugal; although the private sector
saving rate is high, the importing of real resources
should help the development process.
Portugal has made substantial progress on the public
finance front since 1984, In 1989 the general government
deficit amounted to less than4To of GDP. Unfortunately
the orientation of fiscal policy became more expansion-
ary in 1990 in contradiction with the Portuguese authori-
ties'own multi-annual fiscal adjustment strategy. The
latter was slightly revised with the adoption of QUAN-
TUM (Framework for the National Portuguese participa-
tion in EMU) which elaborates on the need for an
adequate macro-economic programme based upon
budgetary adjustment and the priority given to an early
entry of the escudo into the ERM. The fiscal adjustment
component of the QUANTUM programme is based on
expenditure restraint, which should be reinforced by
newly introduced ceilings on global expenditure. An
increase of indirect taxation in line with the Commission
proposals on tax harmonisation is also envisaged. The
budget for 1991, recently approved by the Parliament, is
a step, albeit limited, in the direction of a reduction in
public finance imbalances.
The Portuguese public debt (71,4?o of GDP in 1989),
although far from being the highest in the EC, remains
well above the Community average. The substantial pri-
vatization prograrnme (some 80% of the proceeds will
be used to reduce existing public debt) will make an
important contribution towards a further decline in the
debt/GDP ratio. Together with ceilings on global expen-
diture, such reduction in public debt would make the
implementation of the multi-annual fiscal adjustment
strategy fully credible and thus prepare future ERM
entry.
Since 1984 the Portuguese authorities have been taking
a series of measures to modernize and expand the finan-
cial system, accompanied by a gradual removal of con-
trols on capital movements. Progressively the banking
sector is being opened up to morc competition and at the
same time there has been a gradual abandoning (almost
completed by now) of the administrative setting of bank
interest rates. Compulsory ceilings on private credit ex-
pansion have also been abolished. However excess
liquidity of the banking sector resulting from past central
bank financing of large public sector deficits has delayed
the change to a more market-oriented monetary control.
The removal of exchange controls while inllation re-
mained high and within the context of a pre-announced
exchange-rate depreciation encouraged large short-term
capital imports; the authorities reacted at the beginning
of July 1990 by imposing transitional capital controls,
measures which clearly need to be substituted after some
time by more market-conforming policies. Exchange-
rate policy was also also modified, the rate of deprecia-
tion of the currency being no longer programmed. From
I October 1990, short-term fluctuations of the escudo
against the main ERM currencies were allowed, as a
preparatory step towards future ERM membership.
The main priority for the Portuguese economy must be
the control of inflation. Economic policy needs to be
consistently oriented towards stabilization of the econ-
omy. Particular emphasis should be and has been given
to:
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a reinforcement of monetary stringency in combina-
tion with less predictable exchangc-rate movements;
a tigthening of fiscal policy, reasserting the downward
trend in public deficits to which the government is
committed in its medium-term strategy;
the resumption of an active incomes policy geared to
decreasing nominal wage rises but based on prudent
and credible targets.
However it should bc taken into account that develop-
ments in the Gulf area continue to introduce an important
element of uncertainty for the Portuguese economy,
which has the highest dependency on oil imports in the
Cornnunity.
Portugal since accession
PART I
Portugal since accession
Strong economic performance since accession,
but inflation remains too high and the catching-
up process needs to be reinforced
After significant fluctuation in the first half of the 1980s,
the performance of the Portuguese economy, in the peri-
od since accession to the Community in 1986, has by and
large been encouraging. Output growth has been faster
than in the rest of the Community; the strong expansion
has been brought about by a boom in investment and
exports; employment creation has been substantial,
pushing further down the unemployment rate which was
already low relative to most other Community countries.
With rapid import growth, however, the external current
account has moved into deficit, but at the same time
long-term capital inllows became very substantial and
so the basic balance of payments (current account bal-
ance plus net long term capital inflows) is in large sur-
plus. Progress has also been achieved in reducing the
goverrment deficit and in reversing the rise in the public
debt to GDP ratio; a start has been made on privatization
sales to reduce the heavy role of the State in the owner-
ship of the economy, especially outside the export sec-
tor; the financial markets are gradually being opened up
and freed of administrative controls and monetary policy
is shifting (although not without difficulty) to a more
market-oriented approach.
Hence, economic performance and the policies being
implemented since accession suggest that a good start
has been made on a soundly-based catching-up process.
But a number of concerns and difficulties remain : in-
deed some of these have been exacerbated by previous
successes, the most notable example being the achieve-
ment of Portuguese fiuancial integration into the Com-
munity which has brought new problems for domestic
stabilization policies.
In particular, the inflation performance continues to be
a major area of concern. Between 1984 and early 1988 a
substantial reduction in the inflation rate was achieved,
but since then disinflation has been intemrpted. The
latest available data show a l2-month increase in the CPI
about l3%o, more than three times the average for all
countries belonging to the narrow band of the exchange
rate mechanism (ERM). Price instability of this order
leads to serious misallocation of resources and puts sus-
tainable growth at risk and if it were to continue would
hinder the further integration of Portugal into the Com-
munity.
While after accession cxchange rate policy became pro-
gressively less geared to offset the inflation differential
with the main trading partners, it was faced by a dilemma
concerning the use of the exchange rate to bear down
fully on inflation and the risks this might create of a
gradual loss in competitiveness of Portuguese exports.
In particular the roughly predictable nominal devalu-
ation path for the domestic currency together with high
interest rates encouraged capital inflows, which en-
hanced the financial integration process, but this had at
the same time severely limited the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy. The recent move to a managed float in
preparation to ERM membership must be seen in this
light.
The deterioration in public deficits apparent in 1990, if
not strongly reversed in 1991, will also become a sub-
ject of concem; however, the budget for l99l is only a
limited step in the direction of a reduction in public
finance imbalances. With monetary policy impeded by
high capital inflows, it is especially important that a
more restrictive stance of fiscal policy be pursued to
achieve greater nominal convergence with other Com-
munity countries. In particular the planned adaptation of
Portuguese valued added tax (VAT) and excise duties in
line with the Commission's proposals will make an im-
portant contribution to the necessary reduction of the
public sector deficit. In this respect it should be recog-
nized that the Portuguese authorities are committed to a
medium-term fiscal adjustment strategy which further-
more is also the subject of a joint work prograrnme set
up between the Commission services and the Portuguese
Ministry of Finance.
Portugal is among the least-developed members of the
Community, and its geographical distance from the main
Community concentrations of economic activity makes
it likely that deep structural adjustment will take place
in the run up to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
For the catching-up process now once again under way
to be strengthened and for the stimulus provided by the
completion of the internal market to be benefitted from
fully, the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy
will need to be maintained and if possible reinforced.
This implies that against a background of sound macro-
economic policies and with a proper setting of relative
factor prices the emphasis should be on encouraging
markets to work better, thus improving the allocation of
resources and facilitating structural adjustment. Focus-
ing on the sectors pioducing tradeable goods, the com-
petitiveness of Portuguese products requires, in
particular, that wage increases in Portugal remain rea-
sonablerelative to those elsewhere in the Community. In
this respect it is important to establish a cooperation with
the social partners in order to define an appropriate
strategy for wage moderation; such an agreed strategy
could lessen the need to use exchange-rate policy as an
instrument of discipline of the internal costs which
might impose too high losses in terms of employment
and growth. This is an important prerequisite for the
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continuation of the catching-up process in increasingly
disinflationary conditions and would allow Portugrl tojoin the ERM soon.
The policies already embarked upon by the Portuguese
government of budgetary consolidation and reform, pri-
vatization and deregulation have to be pursued and to be
flanked by a more successful disinflation strategy. Over
and above that, Comrnuniry policies have to play an
important role, both in terms of defining the agenda for
domestic reform and in providing direct support to infra-
structure investment, especially to improve transport
and communications, and to education and training, so
as to help adjustment in the Portuguese economy.
Developments in the Gulf area have introduced an im-
portant element of uncertainty. Portugal is by far the
most oil-dependent country in the Community and con-
sequently the one likely to be most affected if high prices
of oil were to be of long duration.In that case a deterior-
ation of the relative macroeconomic performance of Por-
tugal vis-I-vis the other Community countries cannot be
excluded. This might lead to even greater difficulties for
regaining price stability, a slowdown in the catching-up
process and a widening of the current account deficit.
Therefore countervailing policies, notably in the field of
wage determination, are of utmost importance. Master-
ing the present challenges thus represents a difficult but
by no means insumrountable obstacle on the Portuguese
road to EMU.
Growth led by investment and exports
After a difficult decade following the first oil shock and
the political upheavals of the Portuguese revolution,
culminating in the application of I tight lMF-approved
stabilization policy from 1982 onwards, the Portuguese
economy has been on a recovery path since 1985. Be-
tween that year and 1989 real GDP rose on average by
some 4,7% per year (table 1). Rapid expansion of fixed
investment (by over l27o per year, after having fallen
away sharply during 1983-85) and of exports (l 0,5% per
year) have been the most prominent features of the
growth process, but private consumption has also risen
strongly (5,27o per year), recently supported by a declin-
ing saving ratio. Total demand growth clearly outpaced
the rise in output and so the volume of imports also
expanded very rapidly (16{o per year) putting some
strain on the balance of payments. The imbalance be-
tween demand and domestic supply was particularly
marked in 1987 and 1988, but eased somewhat in 1989
partly in response to some tightening of monetary and
fiscal policy. This more balanced growth pattern is
thought to have been continuing in 1990: real GDP is
expected to rise by some 4,29o (tccording to the Com-
mission services'November 1990 forecasts, see table 2).
Private consumption could increase by 4,5%, while fixed
investment and exports growth should continue strongly
(9,l%o and 10,3% respectively), although a marked de-
celeration of the latter was evident in the second half of
the year.
Hence, growth in Portugal since 1985 has been faster
than in the rest of the Community (by I ll2 percentage
points per year; Portugal 4,7Eo,EC 3,2%). As a conse-
quence there has been a gradual improvement in the level
of GDP per head of the population in Portugal relative
to the sverage for the Community (measured in current
purchasing power standards), rising from 52?o in 1985
to 55?o in 1989 and forecast to continue rising to 56Vo in
1990 (Graph l). But this only takes Portugal back to the
relative position it had already reached in 1973. None-
theless, the carching-up process, which had been stalled
for over a decade, does now seem to be firmly re-estab-
lished, provided that it can be accompanied by the
necessary disinllation.
The world trading environment has strongly contributed
to the present economic expansion, with world trade
volumes rising steadily, and the fall in the oil price in
1986 and the depreciation of the US dollar offering
Portugal substantial terms of trade gains which have
bolstered enterprise profitability and improved general
governm€nt accounts. On the other hand, part of the
growth surge, at least in 1986 and 1987, represented a
cyclical rebound from the recession in 1983 and 1984.
However, a number of indicators seem to suggest that the
growth trend can be sustained. Portuguese marketshares
have improved in most of its trading partner's markets
for manufactured goods. Improved expectations about
future income growth - particularly with the prospects of
further integration of Portugal in the Community - have
generated the faster expansion in investment. On the
political side, the situation has been much more stable
than in the previous decade and the majority government
has embarked upon a programme to modernize and lib-
eralize the economy, helping to build up confidence.
Portugal has traditionnally had a relatively high invest-
ment share in GDB until it was substantially dented by
the investment collapse of 1983-1985. Since then, how-
ever, the sustained massive expansion of fixed invest-
ment (by a cumulative 59% in volume terms) has taken
the share (in current prices) of gross fixed capital forma-
tion back up to2l% of GDP in 1989 (compared withzl%
in the Community as a whole), a rise which should
continue. Much of the investment is being financed by a
surge in direct investment from abroad, especially since
1988, and by rising Community transfers. Invesrment in
equipment has been even more buoyant than in construc-
tion.
Rapid rise in employment pushes unemploy-
ment down even lower
The recovery in the Portuguese economy has been ac-
companied by substantial employment creation, no
doubt helped by highly flexible real wage setting. After
many years of gradual trend decline in total employment,
which became more marked in the first half of the 1980s,
the numbers in jobs have been rising strongln recording
a cumulative increase of almost 896 between 1986 and
1989. Although the labour force has been expanding,
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due to both the steady increase in the population of
working age and a rise in thc participation rate, the
increase in employment has been sufficient to result in
a decline in the unemployment rate from 8,2% in 1986
to 5,07o in 1989 (table 3).
However, the low unemployment rate seems to hide a
high degree of underemployment in the Portuguese econ-
omy, with a very large proportion of employment
(around 2O%) still in the low-productivity agricultural
sector and with much emplo;rment in the public sector at
low levels of efficiency. There is thus every reason to
expect that the growth process will not be held back by
general labour shortages, as there is scope for shifts in
labour to expanding high-productivity sectors. Never-
theless, there is a danger of specific skill shortages, as
the level of general education of the Portuguese work-
force compares unfavourably with most Community
countries and training and vocational qualifications have
been neglected in the past.
ones : metal and electrical products, transPort equip-
ment, ceramics, glass, These sectors are characterized
not only by a more advanced technological content but
also by a high degree of intra-sector international ex-
changes and by the important role of multi-national
investment. Whichever pattern of specialization will
prevail in the future, foreign investment and cooperation
will play a strategic role in structural adjustment of the
Portuguese industry. In this respect, a high investment
ratio and a rapid expansion of the capital stock are
important preconditions for sustained growth, but past
experience suSgests that high investrnent in Portugal has
not always been used effectively - a result which is
particularly harmful in a developing country with a high
relative scarcity of capital. The opening up of the Por-
ruguese economy to foreign investment flows, in condi-
tions of adequate real interest rates, the liberalization
and development of domestic financial markets, and the
greater share of the economy in the private sector should
be helping to improve allocative mechanisms forproduc-
tive investment.
Structural adjustment process sustained by
Community aid and foreign direct investment.
Structural policies and reforms are receiving increasing
attention from the Portuguese authorities, aware of the
structural deficiencies of the country in view of the EC
full membership and the European Single Market. The
large gap in the level of economic development relative
to the EC average calls for long-term policies aimed
particularly at reducing the inadequacy of the infrastruc-
tures which aggravales the peripheral situation of the
country and at improving the education of the labour-
force. In order to assist Portugal in its development
effort, a Community Support Framework (CSD was es-
tablished for the 1989-1993 period. The country may
benefit from the maximum rate of assistance (70% of
eligible public expenditure) and the Community will
more than double its transfers to Portugal between 1988
and 1993, reaching some 3,596 of the Portuguese GDP
(table 4). The two main priorities are precisely the econ-
omic infrastructures projects and human resources. By
its comprehensive nature and by the volume of resources
deployed, the CSF represents an unprecedented develop-
ment effort in the country and may contribute signifi-
cantly to the catching-up process in Portugal.
At present a structural adjustment pr(rcess is underway
in Portugal aiming at the modernization and diversifica-
tion of the industrial structure. The Portuguese manufac-
turing sector still relies strongly on low technology,
labour intensive consumption goods (food products,
wood, textiles, paper and clothing represent some two
thirds of exports). The pattern of trade with the rest of
EC shows mainly an inter-sectoral kind of specializa-
tion. With the country more strongly integrated into the
Europen Single Market, which in turn may become more
open to newly industrialized competitors, it will be more
difficult to maintain a comparative advan[age based ex-
clusively on low wage costs. However, other sectors are
emerging which eventually may replace some traditional
Foreign trade very dynamic; the current ac-
count deficit does not at present appear to be a
serious constraint
As already noted, Portuguese exports and, in particular,
imports have been rising very strongly in the last few
years. Exports have been benefitting from the rapid
expansion of markets, from a competitive position that
in a long-term context looks quite favourable (although,
with exchanSe rate policy becoming less geared to the
depreciation of the escudo, competitivity may gradually
be eroded by too stronS a rise in nominal wage costs)
and from the expansion of capacities through the invest-
ment boom.
Imports have been sucked in by the rapid growth of
demand, especially for capital goods. Trade with the rest
of the Community dominates, representing some 7l?o of
total exports atd 689o of imports in 1989, shares that
have been rising both before and since accession. There
has been a striking increase in the sharc of Portuguese
exports going to Spain, which prior to those two coun-
tries joining the Community was a relatively unimport-
ant trading partner of Portugal but which is now
increasingly becoming a market on a scale consistent
with its geographical closeness.
The accumulated terms of trade gains reached more than
20% during the period 1985-1988; this positive factor
helped to offset partially the effect of the deterioration,
in volume terms, of the Portuguese trade balance, which
has for long exhibited a structural deficit. Nevertheless,
the deficit widened sharply from some 6% of GDP in
1986 to 13%in 1988, before narrowing to llTo in 1989
as a result of a very good export performance last year.
But the trade deficit is to a large extent offset by sur-
pluses on services (especially from tourism) and on
transfers (remittances home from emigrants and EC
transfers). The swing in the current account (table 5)
(2')
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from a surplus in 1986 into a deficit of some 2,3% of.
GDP in 1988 (before nanowing to 1,2?o in 1989) does
not - as yet - appear disquietening, the more so as these
deficits have been more than financed by foreign direct
investment inflows so that the basic balance (current
balance plus all long-term capital flows) recorded a
surplus of 4,5Vo of GDP in 1989. In any case imporrs of
real resources from the rest of the world would not
appear to be inconsistent with the present state of the
Portuguese economy which is faced with an enorrnous
requirement for real convergence. Indeed, for a countr5l
at Portugal's stage of development, with the prospect of
higher returns than in more mature economies, it is quite
appropriate that foreign capital inllows should finance a
part of the high investment needs (quite apart from the
advantages of technology transfer, marketing links, etc.
this brings). Domestic saving in Portugal is, after all, at
a relatively high level, with private sector saving repre-
senting some26?o of GDP in 1989, although rhe govern-
ment sector is a small dissaver. Acurrent account deficit
can thus help the development process, which would be
unnecessarily constrained if forced to rely only on do-
mestic resources.
Progress on inflation arrested since 1988
Throughout the decade after the first oil shock, Portugal
continuously recorded an inflation rate well above the
Community average, peaking in 1984 at299o. Realizing
on one hand that a sustainable growth process requires
more price stability and that a high rate of inflation
results in a marked loss in the efficiency of the economic
system and, on the other hand, that a successful integra-
tion of the Portuguese economy in the Community re-
quires better nominal convergence, the national
authorities began in 1985 to place disinflation as the top
priority of economic policy.
From then until Spring 1988, there was a period of steady
disinflation during which the inflation rate (as measured
by the consumer price index (CP! was brought down ro
almost 87o. This sharp reduction in inflation was
achieved as a result of the slower rise of world prices
(influenced by the widespread success of disinllationary
policies, by favourable movemenls in the US dollar and
by the oil price fall), a lower depreciation rate for the
escudo, the beginning of a policy of fiscal consolidation
and moderate wage developments (table 7). A degree of
social consensus helped to obtain this relative wage
moderation which, together with rapid productivity
gains, has resulted in a steady decline in real unit labour
costs (down by a cumulative 19% between 1981 and
I 989) and a corresponding rise in the profit share. It has
to be noted that, real wages have shown significant
downward flexibility, even in the long run, in response
either to exchange rate devaluations or to higher than
expected price increases. This was supported by wage
settlements which were not fully indexed to price
changes and thus had a moderate effect on inflation
dynamics.
However, the inflation rate accelerated sharply in the
Summer of 1988, climbing back up during 1989 to
12,7%, and to l3,6Vo, in average, the following year.
This acceleration occurred despite the continued favour-
able evolution of wages and salaries (the nominal rise
per head decelerating by some 4 percentage points to
l3,47obetute,en 1987 and 1988) and despite substantial
reductions in the government deficit in both 1988 and
1989, but in the context of a highly accomodating do-
mestic monetary policy until early 1989. The effective-
ness of monetary policy has also been decreased over the
last few years by the existence of a pre-announced ex-
change-rate target (in the form of a crawling-peg). As-
sociated with a rapidly increasing level of capital
mobility between Portugal and abroad and flanked by
high nominal interest rates, this made capital imports all
the more rewarding. The overliquid condition of the
banking system, sitting on a huge stock of secondary
liquid assets mainly resulting from past monetization of
Sovernment deficits, increased the ineffectiveness of
credit ceilings as an instrument of monetary control.
In these conditions, a sharp rise in food prices, resulting
from difficult weather conditions in the Summer of 1988
and again at the end of 1989 and early in 1990 con-
tributed to a turnaround in inflation. Food products have
a large weight (46Vo) it the CP[, and food imports have
for the most part not yet been liberalized (the transition
arrangements under the Treaty of Accession extend, in
some cases, until 1996), so food prices appear particu-
larly sensitive to domestic supply conditions. The prices
of services also continued to rise strongly as wage
awards in line with productivity gains in the sectors
subject to international competition spread through the
economy.
Furthermore, the progressive integration of the Por-
tuguese economy into the Community is resulting in an
enlargement of the range of tradables, driving some
Portuguese prices to an incipient rise, which should lead
to a greater equalization with those abroad. More gener-
ally, demand growth in 1987 and 1988 appears to have
been excessive and well above supply potential, as evi-
denced by the rapid rise in imports and the upward trend
of profit margins, which, within the framework of an
expansionary monetary policy stance, allowed food
price developments to be transmitted to other prices. The
impact of strong domestic demand on inflation is likely
to have resulted particularly from pressure on non-trad-
ables prices, where supply constraints are clearly more
binding; in addition, demand for certain non-tradables
may have been increasing at an even faster rate than
households permanent income, reflecting their high in-
come elasticity.
Some tightening of monetary policy in March 1989 and
some slowing in domestic demand growth have led to a
steadying of the inllation rate at its higher level, but
there are as yet no signs that the necessary downward
trend has been re-established. An acceleration in nomi-
nal wage costs scems to have taken place in 1990 and
future wage negotiations face the difficulty that bargain-
ing on the basis of government inflation targers has not
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yet regained credibility. Moreover, while exchanSe rate
policy remains non-accommodating, fiscal policy
showed a more expansionary stance in 1990. In view of
this insufficiently restrictive stance of overall demand
management the price climate remains very vulnerable
to any adverse developments. Given the importance that
should be attached to reentering decisively I Path of
disinllation and to the achievement of nominal conver-
gence with the rest of the Community (beyond irc own
merits the attainment of this objective is vital for a
successful Portuguese participation in EMU), a wider
range of stability policy oPtions needs now to be con-
sidered, and the final section of this paper addresses this
problem. tn this context, an active incomes policn based
on prudent and credible targets, is to be welcomed.
Budgetary consolidation and reform still have
further to go
The Portuguese Sovenrment embarked upon a process of
budgetary consolidation after 1984, when the general
government deficit (national accounts definition)
reached a peak of l27o of GDP. The main aims of the
programme have been :
. to achieve a marked reduction in the general govern-
ment deficit;
. to reform both indirect and direct taxation;
. to increase transparency in public debt financing.
A stronger commitment to budgetary adjustment as part
of a comprehensivo medium-term macro-economic
strategy came in March 1987 when the government
adopted the PCEDED (Programme for the structural ad-
justment of the external deficit and unemployment)
which set rules for medium-term expenditure restraint.
Arevised version waspublished inJuly 1989, emphasiz-
ing the importance of the fiscal adjustment Programme
for the control of inflation and the encouragement of the
catching-up process, and recognizing the need for a
gradual rise in the tax burden along with continued tight
control of spending in order to achieve deficit reduction
targets.
In June 1990 the national authorities announced the
QUANTT M (Framework of National Adjustment for the
transition to EMU) as the strategy for Portuguese partici-
pation in EMU. Besides expressing the full Portuguese
commitment to EMU, QUANTUM sets nominal conver-
gence as the first priority of economic policy and its
main component is a fiscal adjustment programme based
not only on expenditure restraint but also on an increase
of indirect taxation, in line with the Commission's pro-
posal on tax harmonization.
Between l9M and 1989, the general government deficit
was reduced by more than 8 Percentage points to 3,8%
of GDP (table 8). This was secured through t41o of GDP
reduction in total expenditure (mainly achieved in 1985
and concentrated in reduced transfers and subsidies to
enterprises) nd a 29o rise in the tax burden (including
social security contributions). The adjustment was un-
doubtedly helped by the rapid expansion of the economy
during this period and was achieved despite less success
in restraining expenditures than planned.
Overhauls of the tax system were made in 1986, when
VAT was introduced to rePlace a wide range of existing
indirect taxes, and in 1989, when the direct tax system
was reformed with marginal personal income tax rates
reduced and many exemPtions and incentives abolished'
The new VAT system has been successful in generating
much higher tax revenues than the sales taxes it replaced,
and the Portugues€ authorities are confident that the
direct tax reforms will also yield large Permanent
revenue gains.
The high deficits in the late 1970s and early 1980s led'
despite the high inflation rates, to a rapid escalation in
the public debt ratio which climbed from only l7?o of
GDP in 1974to74%by 1988, but a reduction (to7l,49o)
was already achieved in 1989 (graph 2)' This is higher
than the Community average but still lower than in
several other Community countries with budgetary Prob-
lems. On 1989 parameters, the debt ratio is no longer on
an unsustainable path, the primary balance (excluding
interest payments) being in surplus by 2,4% of GDP (but
this is before taking into account financial transactions
which also have to be financed by borrowing), and the
average effective interest cost of the public debt being
less than the nominal Srowth rate of the economy. But
this picture needs to be qualified in relation to several
specific features of the Portuguese situation :
. administrative control of the financial system, credit
ceilings and the consequent need for banks to invest in
government securities have in the Past resulted in
cheap financing for the public sector through a form
of hidden taxation; as the financial system is lib-
eralised with preferential circuits more or less abol-
ished and interest rates set in a market framework, the
government is now also being obliged to borrow under
market conditions, pushing up the average real cost of
the public debt - a process that still has further to go,
Success in lowering inllation is also likely to imply
some further increase in real interest rates for Sovern-
ment borrowing. On the other hand, as Portugal be-
came more closely integrated in European financial
markets, the risk premium was reduced. At longer term
as Portugal is achieving convergence further reduction
can be expected;
. in the period up to 1984 much borrowing was carried
out by autonomous government agencies and public
enterprises and was not included in the government
accounts and public debt figures' Since then the Treas-
ury has been taking over much of this debt, where it
cannot be serviced by the issuing institutions, leading
to a larger rise in the public debt than can be explained
by annual borowing flows; further cases of Treasury
debt takeovers are exPected, helping to make the pub-
lic finances more transParent;
. by contrast, the government has embarked upon a
privatization progranrme which, after constitutional
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amendment to allow the full sale of public 
€nterprises,
is now being extended and accelerated, with receipts
totalling over 7?o of GDP likely by 1993; these re-
ceipts are being used to reduce the public debt.
The need to set in train a reduction in the debt/GDPrario
and (in due course) the interest burden, to reduce the
high share of domestic financial resources pre-empted
by government borrowing and consequently denied to
the private s€ctor, to support a tighter and more effective
monetary policy, to greatly reduce the monetary financ-
ing of the govemment ssctor, to exert some dampening
effect through fiscal policy on excessive demand
growth, and hence, in conjunction with other policies, to
bear down strongly on inllation, all emphasize the im-
portance of a continued medium-term adjustment strate-
gy for the public finances. This will require the
maintenance of expenditure restraint and restructuring
of the budget to reflect prioritites : for example, the
domestic financial counterpsrt required to match trans-
fers from the Community structural funds will impose a
very stringent and selective approach to public sector
investment projects not eligible for Community funding.
A further gradual rise in the tax burden also appears
inevitable; the adaptation of Portuguese VAT and excise
duties in line with the Commission's harmonization pro-
posals would provide some welcome extra revenues
(through high excise duties on alcohol and tobacco and
a reduction in the large coverage of the zero rate of VAT),
and some further broadening of the direct tax base may
be necessary.
In 1990 a rise in the general government deficit to some
6% of GDP seems likely (from 3,8% in 1989), although
efforts have been made to control the execution of the
budget. This increase results mainly from a higher wage
bill induced by civil service pay reform, the effect of
accelerated tax payments under the direct tax reform in
1989, and a substantial rise in the interest burden follow-
ing not only the hike in interest rates last year but also a
large placement of public debt at the end of 1989. Ad-
ditional measures of expenditure restraint have been
adopted during the year (aimed at saving some 0,5% of
GDP) but they were followed by a decision to award a
large 2increase in social security pensions. Budgetary
developments in 1990 were clearly out of line with the
government's medium-term intentions, and may have
given the wrong signals at a time when countering infla-
tionary pressures is so important. The credibility which
the government has successfully built up over the last
five years in this area needs to be maintained as it is a
major input to the overall credibility of economic policy.
For that reason, the mildly restrictive stance of the l99l
budget needs to be reinforced in the forthcoming years.
Development and liberalization of the financial
system and a more market-oriented approach
to monetary control
Since 1984 the Portuguese authorities have been taking
a series of steps to modernize and expand the financial
system, so that it can serve the needs of the economy
more efficiently. In the past the financial system had
been characterized by a low level of sophistication
(limited range of instruments, non-existent or shallow
secondary markets), a lack of exposure to irurovative
foreign influence, a domination by the non-competitive
nationalized banks, and a wide range of administrative
controls on interest rates and lending.
Gradually the banking sector is being opened up to more
competition, with new banks and foreign entrants
allowed since 1984 and the privatization process now
gathering momentum. Attempts are being made to en-
courage and develop new instruments, markets and fin-
ancial intermediaries in order to diversify away from
over-reliance on short-term bank credit (although this
process remains difficult while inJlation is still high).
Existing institutions (such as the stock exchange) are
being modernized. The tax treatment of different finan-
cial instruments has been simplified in the 1989 reform,
reducing distortions and increasing transparency.
At the same time there has been a progressive abandon-
ment of the administrative setting of bank interest rates;
by now only the minimum rate on six-month deposits is
still subject to direct control. Compulsory ceilings on the
private credit expansion in individual banks, have also
been abolished in March 1990; banks were asked to
respect a global target of zero credit growth for the
second half of 1990 but even rhis limit is abolished in
January 199 1. However, given the massive excess
liquidity (financial resources which are not being used
as credit) of the banking sector, the effectiveness of
those instructions is doubtful. Excess liquidity resulted
from past central bank financing of large public sector
deficits and has been the major reason delaying the
change to 8 system of better monetary control based on
open-market operarions. Its definitive elimination, via
the selling of public debt instruments to the non-banking
sector, may imply some increase in public debt interest
costs but it is indeed an unavoidable move in order to
improve control over the money supply and consequent-
ly the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Deregulation of the domestic financial sector is being
accompanied by the gradual removal of capital controls,
although Portugal is entitled to delay full liberalization
of capital movements until 1996. Inward direct invest-
ment has been free ofexchange controls since the begin-
ning of 1990 and the freeing of outward portfolio
investment in several steps has recently been completed
in advance of the Community end-1990 deadline. But the
difficulties which may be created by the removal of
exchange controls before the necessary adjustment in
inflationary conditions has been achieved, are illustrated
by the strong short-term capital inflows, which could
amount to the very large level of lo?o of GDp in 1990,
attracted by high interest rates and the quasi-guaranteed
crawling-peg depreciation path for the escudo. Thc auth-
orities reacted at rhe beginning of July by effectively
suspending for 90 days purely financial transactions in
the forward market and through the impositionof a4O%
interest-free deposit on external borrowing - clearly
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measures which need to be substituted after some time
by more market-conforming policies. In an important
step to reduce capital inflows and increase the anti-infla-
tionary stance of monetary policy, the Bank of Portugal
further decided to replace the pre-announced monthly
depreciation with a more market - determined ex-
change-rate, allowed to fluctuate within certain unan-
nounced limits against ERM currencies.
Within this framework of system reform, monetary con-
ditions, which had been rather expansionary between
1986 and 1988, were tightened as from March 1989 as
inflationary pressures became more apparent. The broad
measure of liquidity, L-, on which the authorities focus
has slowed to an annual rate of expansion of about 10,5%
in the second quarter of 1990; however it acc€lerated
sharply in the following months.
Re-establishing the downward trend in infla-
tion and preparing for membership of the ERM
The Portuguese government has committed itself to
membership of the ERM and announced its willingness
to participate fully from the beginning in the construc-
tion of EMU, but tho precise timing of entry is likely to
depend on achieving the necessary narrowing in the
large inflation differential relative to existing ERM
countries. Getting the better of present inflationary con-
ditions will call for a tightening of fiscal policy, the
maintenance of a restrictive monetary policy, wage
moderation and less predictable exchange rate develop-
ments (including perhaps a mild appreciation of the
escudo during the transitional period before ERM
entry) :
. the relaxation of fiscal policy in 1990 has to be
reversed as soon as possible, reasserting the downward
trend in public deficits to which the government is
committed in its medium-term strategy;
. interest rates were raised in 1989 and the growth of the
monetary aggregates subsequently slowed, but some
reinforcement of this tight monetary stance may have
to be considered;
. wage developments have not up to now been the prime
source of inflationary pressures in Portugal and it is
especially important that the traditional degree of real
wage moderation rppears not only as a final outcome
but that it is fully anticipated and agreed by the social
partners. Only if nominal claims against the produc-
tion potential are reduced from the outset will it be
possible to resume the necessary disinflation of the
economy;
. the already non-accommodating exchange rate policy
has been recently modified; in addition to a change in
the reference basket ofcurrencies, which now includes
only ERM currencies, since I October the escudo has
been allowed to float, in order to make the high Por-
tuguese interest rates less attractive to short-term capi-
tal inflows and consequently to increase the anti-infla-
tionary stance of monetary policy.
Once the downward trend in inflation is firmly re-estab-
lished then entry into the ERM (perhaps initially within
a wider band) could help to reinforce this process, en-
couraging expectations of a further fall in inflation,
confcrring greater credibility on government policies
and disciplining cost developments. This is why the
current exchange rate regime can be described as a pre-
pegging float.
Is there a danger of some incompatibility between the
twin objectives of nominal and real convcrgence and will
it be necessary to give priority to one over the other?
Certainly the timetable now being discussed for the
moves to EMU indicates the urgency of Portugal achiev-
ing much lower inflation and a stable budgetary position
if it is to avoid becoming one of a second tier of countries
not yet ready to take a full part in the EMU process. In
the next few years this may mean greater restraint on
growth, so that the price-stability objective can be met.
Such a policy is not incompatible with the pursuit of
strategies to open up, modernize ud restructure the
economy in the context of the opportunities offered by
the completion of the internal market and beyond. The
improvement in supply potential to be obtained from the
building up of the stock of capital in productive and
infrastructure assets, from the upgrading of the skills of
the workforce, and from the removal of stultifying and
distorting regulations and rigidities need not be inter-
rupted during this period of disinflation. Greater sta-
bility once it has been achieved (and the past flexibility
of the wage bargaining process in Portugal suggests that
this could be at a level of external competitiveness which
would not permanently hinder growth), should actually
reinforce growth prospects by improving confidence,
removing distortions to price signals and facilitating the
integration of Portugal into the Community economy.
The above analysis needs however be qualified in some
important aspects if the recent developments in the Gulf
lead to a lasting increase in the price of oil. For the
Community that would represent an assyurmetric real
shock with Portugal being one of the most affected
countries. From a longer term perspective perhaps a
depreciation of the currency above the inflation differen-
tial with the main trading partners would prove necess-
ary which, furthermore, would be associated, in the more
immediate future, with greater difficulties in securing
nominal and real convergence with the Community, The
disinflation strategy should then rely less on the ex-
change rate policy and more on the r€strictive stance of
domestic, fiscal, monetary and incomes policies. Yet the
substantial long-run benefits of Portuguese participation
in EMU allow a more marked (albeit temporary) slow-
down in output and employment growth than otherwise
would be necessary to achieve price stability to be ex-
pected.
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Special Topics
CHAPTER 1
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND PUBLIC
FINANCE POLICY
A sharp deterioration of the Portuguese public finances
following the first oil shock was reversed only in 1985
when the national authorities embarked on a prograurme
of fiscal consolidation. Despite a significant improve-
ment, the deficit of the general government is still to be
considered too high as a proportion of GDP and the debt
ratio stands above the Community average. In a longer
perspective several factors will have an important im-
pact on the Portuguese public finances, particularly capi-
tal expenditures aimed at co-financing the Community
structural funds. In such a context, the Portuguese auth-
orities have adopted a medium term comprehensive mac-
roeconomic strategy in the framework of which the
necessary fiscal adjustment is defined.
1. Fiscalconsolidation
l.l In the beginning of the seventies, public finance in
Portugal was characterized by balanced budgets and a
low level of indebtedness. Following the first oil shock,
the Portuguese public finances deteriorated sharply. This
trend was attributable not only to the unfavourable mac-
roeconomic conditions but also to the change of political
regime, lower priority given to fiscal discipline, larger
transfers to households, regions and local authorities,
decolonizati,on, within a context of an inefficient tax
system. As some general government imbalances were
shifted to public enterprises accounts, the combined bor-
rowing requirement of the public sector (general govern-
ment and public enterprises) is the more accurate
indicator of the deficit of public finances : it reached
2l,5Eo of GDP in 1984.
In 1985 the Portuguese authorities embarked on a pro-
grarnme of fiscal consolidation which also aimed at a
much needed clarification of the public sector financing.
The main features of the prografllme were :
a)marked reduction in the general government deficit;
Part II
b)a reform of both indirect and direct taxation;
c)an increased transparency in public debt financing.
1.2 Af,ter peaking at 12% of GDP in 1984, the general
government deficit' entered a steady downward path and
in 1989 emounted to less than 4Vo of GDP. An effort of
expendinrre restraint took place, although the level of
total budgetary expenditure as a GDP ratio is amongst
the lowest of the Community. The improvement in the
primary balance was even more impressive than that of
the overall balance with a deficit of 4,9?o of GDP in 1984
turning into a surplus of 3,5Vo in 1989. It has to be
stressed, however, that the main contributions to this
consolidation came from the cyclical upturn of the econ-
omy, combined with the appropriation by the public
sector of a large share of the impressive tenns of trade
gains recorded by the Portuguese economy between
1985 and 1988 (the latter explaining for insrance rhe
sharp reduction registred by current transfers to enter-
prises).
1.3 The reform ofthe direct and indirect tax system were
also instrumental in the reduction of the general govern-
ment deficit. The single most importanr development
was undoubtedly the restructuring of indirect taxation
brought about by the successfull introduction of VAT in
1986. In addition to the associated efficiency gains, the
broader tax base and the surfacing of previously unre-
corded activities boosted VAT receipts about 4096 above
the level which might have been collected from the taxes
it replaced. As far as the reform of direct taxation is
concerned, it represented a much less radical departure
from the previous system. Its implementation took place
in 1989 and, except for a temporary effect due to the
change to shorter delays of payment, it should not lead
to a marked increase in fiscal pressure'. The main posi-
tive impact is a marked reduction in several tax distor-
tions (particularly resulting from very high marginal tax
rates on household income and the existence of a large
and intricate set of fiscal incentives and exemptions)
which had characterized the previous system. However,
there is a distinct possibility that a greater simplification
of the direct tax system could not only achieve further
efficiency and equity gains but. also generate additional
revenues.
1
2
Excluding finsrcial transactions and in particular "Activos ftralrceiros" e "Outras operagoes de capital".
Except for the newly-introduced taxation of prblicdebt interest payern€nts, which however has a roughly neutral imprct on
the budget deficit given the offsecing irrrease in gross hterest pay€rn€nts.
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1.4 As far as the outlook for 1990 for the general gov-
ernment deficit is concerned, the available information
points to a marked deterioration compared to the pre-
vious year. The increrse in deficit will reflect the end of
the extraordinary gains in tax revenue brought about by
the transition to the new system of direct taxation the
previous year, the sharp increase in the interest burden
(as a consequence not only of higher interest rates but
mainly of a calendar effect resulting from a large place-
ment of public debt at the end of 1989), and more par-
ticularly the adverse impact on the wage bill of the
current reform of the civil service pay system. In order
to counter the deterioration in the budget deficit, the
government adopted several measures of expenditure
restraint, particularly as far as current purchases of
goods and services are concerned. However, these
measures, which aim at a saving of 0.57o of GDP, were
more than offset by the subsequent increase in social
security pensions.
1.5 The 1991 budget has been recently approved by the
Parliament. It aims at a return to a downward path for
the public finance imbalances : the projected deficit is
Esc. 613 billion, decreasing from 6.57o of GDP in 1990
(last official forecast) to 6.37o in 1991. Except for the
continued impact of the 1989 change to the taxation of
public debt payements, the fiscal burden should remain
roughly unchanged; in particular no major increase of
indirect taxation - envisaged in the national authorities
medium-term macroeconomic strategy - is forecast. An
effort to moderate non-interest and non-wage current
expenditure has been made in order to make room for a
207o increase in central government investment, this last
development being closely associated with the rising
trend of utilisation of Community structural funds by
Portugal. On the other hand, social security transfers to
households should continue to rise a a fast pace, in part
due to demographic factors. A very positive develop-
ment, particularly from the point of view of curbing
expenditure growth, concerns the expanded coverage of
the State budget. The budgets of the central administra-
tion autonomous bodies, which are still responsible for
a large share of total public expenditure, are now in-
cluded in the State budget document and approved
together with the latter. All in all, the 1991 budget can
be described as a mildly restrictive one which, together
with the projected privatizations proceeds for the next
year, should lead to another reduction in the public
debt/GDP ratio.
1.6 In order to improve the transparency of the public
sector financing, financial imbalances which were
shifted during the first half of the 80's to autonomous
bodies of the central administration and public enter-
prises were progressively incorporated since 1985 into
the public debt : on one hand widespread arrears existing
both towards public enterprises and the banking system
and which roughly amounted to 12,5?o of 1986 GDP
were settled; additionnaly, several autonomous funds
and services of the central administration were wound
up or integrated within government bodies covered by
the state budget, with the Treasury taking over their
liabilities. However, despite the substantial debt take-
overs by the Treasury, which have already occurred,
there remains several important cases to be solved (local
authorities'debt to the electricity monopoly, bad loans
of public sector banks, etc.).
The main financial consequence of this greatly improved
transparency in public finance management was, at
general govenrment level, a much faster increase in
public debt than that warranted by deficits. The Por-
tuguese public debt/GDP ratio rose steadly up to 1988,
when it peaked at 74%. Due to a large negative real
interest rate - GDP growth differential, a marked im-
provement in the primary balance and despite new debt
take-overs by the Treasury a reduction in the debt/GDP
ratio (to 71,4?o) took place last year; in 1990 another
reduction in the debtGDP ratio is expected to have oc-
curred. However, even at this level the Portuguese ratio
- although far from being the highest in the Community -
stands well above the Community average.
The second aspect of the clarification effort undertaken
by the Portuguese authorities is connected with the in-
creased transparency in public debt financing. Until re-
cently, large budget deficits were mostly financed by the
issue of high-powered money, leading the central bank
to resort to credit ceilings to avoid an unsustainable level
- particularly from an external point of view - of overall
domestic credit. The resulting excess liquidity of the
banking system was then used to place public debt at
very favourable interest rates. Another consequence of
credit ceilings and the situation of financial repression
was that, in order to sustain the profitability of the
banking system, the differencial between deposit and
lending rates bcame very large.
The internal and external liberalization of the financial
markets which has also been taking place since 1985
have led to a progressive reduction of the importance of
"implicit taxation" (seignorage, benefits indirectly ac-
cruing to the budget from the large differential between
lending and borrowing interest rates, etc.). Above all,
interest rates on domestic public debt became largely
market-determined and began to signal the true cost of
public debt. The move from credit ceilings towards indi-
rect instruments of monetary control, which is now tak-
ing place, will certainly imply further progress in the
conditions of public debt financing.
2. Longer term factors of evolution of
public finance :
2.1 On a more extended perspective, several factors will
have a particularly important impact on the evolution of
the Portuguese public finances. In addition to the culrent
transition to indirect instruments of monetary control
which is expected to lead to a lasting increase in public
debt domestic interest rates, they are : the budgetary
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impact of structural funds, demographic trends and their
implications for the social security accounts, indirect tax
harmonization within the Community and the privatiza-
tion process.
2.2The Portuguese authorities face the problem of how
to achieve full utilization of Community structural funds
without an unsustainable acceleration of total capital
expenditure.
The financial flows of the Community structural policy
in favour ofPortugal for the period 1989-1993 are con-
centrated in the Community Support Framework (CSF).
Transfers from the Structural funds will amount to about
3,54o of GDP during that period. Total transfers in fa-
vour of Portugal may eventually become higher due to
financial support under Community initiatives which are
not included in the CSF. They will have an impact on the
capital budget of the general government and thus on the
strategy of fiscal adjustment due to the fact that a large
part of them will be allocated to the co-financing of
public capital expenditure. Under the CSF indicative
plan for the period 1989-1993, in a total public spending,
mainly investment, of 13.616 million ECU (in 1989
prices) the share of the national public finance require-
ments will amount to about 49%. The growth of such
spending will be steady during the period (17,77o in
1990,9,27o in 1991, 8,97o in 1992 nd l5,l?o in 1993).
However, the precise figures to be recorded in the
general government budget will be different given the
indicative nature of the financial plan of the CSF and the
fact that the budget is made on a payment basis. Due to
the large share of commitments related to the Structural
funds in total capital expenditure (around 5A7o in 1990),
the non-cofinanced capital expenditure will have to
grow marginally or even decline, unless total capital
expenditure is allowed to accelerate significantly. This
means that the room of manoeuwe of the Portuguese
authorities is becoming increasingly limited and the suc-
cess of the medium term fiscal adjustment strategy may
imply a very modest real growth, or perhaps even a
freeze in public non-cofinanced investment.
2.3 In regard to the financial situation of the social
security system, the problem facing the Portuguese
authorities is not only the budgetary implications of the
gradual ageing of the popula3ion but also the very low
Ievel of the old age and disability pensions, particularly
those of the non-contributive regime. The key policy
variable in this area is undoubtedly the extenr of the
annual uprating of pensions in real terms; according to
previous statements made by the Portuguese authorities,
this would remain below 27o. Under this scenario and
given the continuation of a favourable macro-economic
situation (namely a low rate of unemployment and posi-
tive real wage growth) the financial position of the social
security system would not suffer a deterioration for the
next few years despite the already low ratio between
contributors and beneficiaries and the increasing number
of the latter; as for other European countries, the long-
term prospects for the social security system are much
more pessimistic due to an expected acceleration in the
population ageing pr(rcess. [t has to be stressed that this
year extraordinary increase of social security pensions
(granting of an extra monthly payement) - although jus-
tified from a purely social viewpoint - represents a clear
departure from the fiscal adjustment strategy announced
by the Portuguese authorities. However pressure for
further substantial increases in the purchasing power of
pensions is likely to persist.
2.4 The projected harmonization of indirect iaxation
within the Community would provide Portugal with an
excellent opportunity to boost tax revenues and a con-
tribution to a reduction of the level of the general gov-
ernment deficit. Cur:rent Commission proposals imply,
in particular, the suppression of the zero rate which
applies now to more than 2O% of the VAT base and the
increase in excise duties on tobacco and alcoholic bever-
ages, resulting in a net gain to the budget; this increase
in revenues might be close to 2% of GDP. Anyhow, the
minimization of its adverse impact on inflation calls for
a gradual implementation of the harmonization
measures.
2.5 Another important contribution to the public finance
adjustment is expected to come from the massive gov-
enrment privatization programme. As a result of the
nationalization in 1975, Portugal currently has a large
public sector in both the "productive" and the financial
sectors. Figures for 1988 show that the former accounted
for about 12,5% of GDP while stage-owned financial
institutions retain, by far, a dominant position in the
financial sector. The privatization process began in
April 1989 but, for constitutional reasons, privatization
operations were last year restricted to 49% of the capital
involved. The constitutional ammendment in the sum-
mer of 1989 opened the way to the first full privatiza-
tions, which have already taken place this year. Under
the government's programme full privatization shall be
the rule for virtually the entire public sector and they are
expected to last at least until 1993.
Although the amount of revenue to be raised is im-
possible to assess given the unpredictability of capital
market conditions, it could be in excess of 600 billion
escudos at 1990 prices (around 7,57o of GDP). As an-
nounced by national authorities, privatization proceeds
(a minimum of 80% of gross receipts) should be used to
reduce existing public debt in order to ease the dynamics
of the debt GDP/ratio and to reduce the budget deficit
via a lower interest burden. However, its positive impact
will be partially offset by the expecred continuation of
debt takeovers by the Treasury.
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3. Fiscal adjustment strategy :
PCEDED (Programme for the structural
correction of external deficit and unem.
ployment) and QUANTUM
An improvement in the design of the Portuguese fiscal
policy came with the adoption of a comprehensive mac-
roeconomic strategy (PCEDED-Programme for the
structural correction of external deficit and unemploy-
ment) by the government in March 1987. For fiscal
policy purposes the most important feature was the ac-
knowledgment that the successful reduction of the
general government deficit needed a strong but conti-
nued effort in the framework of a medium-term pro-
gramme. The fiscal adjustment strategy was based
exclusively on expenditure restraint, namely i zeto or
close to zero real growth of public consumption, sub-
sidies and budget transfers to autonomous central admin-
istration bodies, real growth ofper-capita social security
transfers to households below 2?o aleff and a very strict
selection process for public investment projects without
EC funding. A revised version of the PCEDED was
published in July 19893, giving a much more important
role to the fiscal adjustment programme; the success of
the latter was explicitly presented as a necessary condi-
tion for the achievement of the catching-up process of
the Portuguese economy and the reduction of the infla-
tion rate to the Community average. Another important
departure from the original PCEDED concerns the ac-
knowledgment by the Portuguese authorities that the
expenditure restraint effort needed to be complemented
by a progressive increase in the tax burden, which was
supposed to be induced solely by last year's direct tax
reform,
Recently the national authorities announced the Quan-
tum (Framework of the National Adjustment to the tran-
sition for EMU) as a strategy for the Portuguese
participation in EMU being currently developed at the
Ministry of Finance. Quantum elaborates on the long-
term benefits of EMU, the need for an adequate macro-
economic strategy based upon budgetary adjustment in
order to reduce transition costs (mainly identified as
resulting from the inflation differential) and the priority
given to an early entry of the escudo to the ERM. Quan-
tum can be seen as an improved and revised version of
the PCEDED, focusing on the transition to EMU. It is,
however, much less detailed.
The fiscal adjustment component of the Quantum is once
again based on expenditure restraint but an increase of
indirect taxation, in line with the Commission's proposal
on tax harmonization, is also envisaged. It is difficult to
evaluate the fiscal adjustment effort implicit in Quantum
as no detailed data were yet provided. Anyhow it seems
to be an adequate fiscal adjustment strategy, compatible
with the progressive reduction of the inflation differen-
tial between Portugal and the EC average and an active
participation of Portugal in the construction of EMU.
The general impression is that the Portuguese authorities
have sufficient room for manoeuvre to successfully im-
plement a fiscal adjustment effort. However, the existing
room for manoeuvre depends, to a large extent, on the
"windfall" receipts resulting from the privatization pro-
cess. Given its transitory nature - albeit with positive
lasting effects when used to reduce public debt - the
underlying adjustment must be robust enough to avoid
the re-emergence of imbalances from 1993 onwards,
when the process of privatization might have come to an
end. On the other hand, the experience of Portugal and
countries that have followed fiscal adjustment strategies
based almost entirely on expenditure restraint suggests
that a reduction or even a stabilization in real terms in
public expenditure is very difficult to achieve and that,
in many cases, it is essential for the revenue side to
contribute to the adjustment. Consequently, in view of
the importance of a successful fiscal adjustment for the
future of the Portuguese economy, there are grounds to
recommend that the possibility of taking discretionary
measures to increase the tax burden (others than those
associated with fiscal harmonization within the Com-
munity) should not be ruled out. Furthermore, additional
revenues are to be expected from a greater simplification
of the tax system than that achieved in the 1989 tax
reform, even without involving increased rates.
3 A detailed evaluation of the fiscal adjusunent strategy contained in the revised version of the PCEDED, togeilrer with an
analysis of the medium-term prospocB of the Portuguese public finances was done in 0re Commission document
"Contrihrtioru towrds a Multiannual Fiscal Adjustment Strategy (MAFAS) for Porurgal" (see background pqers).
(3)
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CHAPTER 2
MONETARY AND EXCHANGE
RATE POLICY
l. The stance of monetary policy since 1986
There is no single measure for the stance of monetary
policy in Portugal and any analysis of the subject should
take into account that the rapid financial integration of
the Portuguese economy with the world economy which
took place in the last few years rendered progressively
more difficult to reconcile domestic monetary control
with an exchange rate target (crawling-peg). This led on
I October 1990 to a float of the escudo within non-spe-
cified limits defined against other ERM-currencies
which can be described as a pre-pegging float. V/hile
interest rates and liquidity aggregates would suggest an
expansionary stance from 1986 to 1988, exchange-rate
policy was less accomodating. Moreover, financial de-
regulation and integration made the interpretation of
monetary variables and their control increasingly more
difficult, After the rebound in the inflation since the end
of 1988, interest rate and credit developments indicate a
monetary tightening, that was, however, not accompa-
nied by an exchange-rate policy sufficiently tight to
reinforce the anti-infl ationary measures.
From 1986 to 1988, monetary policy was rather expan-
sionary:
. The targets set allowed the liquidity ratio of the econ-
omy to rise. Moreover, money supply growth tended
to overshoot even $ese objectives as capital inflows
turned out to be larger than anticipated. The growth
of the target liquidity aggregate, L-, decelerared from
28.5% at the end of 1985 to26.3% by December 19g6
and 17.51o by December 1987 to 15% December lggg
but remained above rates considered by the Banco de
Portugal to be in Iine with monetary stability.
. The loose stance of monetary policy was also reflected
in short-term interest rates (three month treasury bill)
which came down from over 2O?o in 1985 to l2.SVo in
December 1988.
. However, exchange-rate policy had a disinllationary
impact during this period. The crawling-peg exchange
rate policy was based on decreasing rates ofdeprecia-
tion from the beginning of 1986 : 8.1% in 1986,6.7%
in 1987 ard4.8% in 1988 and3%in 1989. Comparing
the relative unit Iabour costs of portugal with its
19 main trade parurers, this implied a cumulative real
appreciation of the escudo of some 8%.
But in March 1989, restrictive monetary policy measures
to cool inflationary pressures were prompted by a
marked acceleration in the inllation rate, which was
projected ar the rime ro reach 12% in 1989:
. the discount ratc was raised by I percentage point to
l4?o. The capital market reference rate increased
similarly to some 16%;
. reserve requirements were increased to l7?o up from
an average of 5.6% and unified across an enlarged
incidence base;
. credit expansion was tightened and its control was
changed to a monthly basis from a bi-monthly one;
. the crawling-peg of the escudo was fixed at an annual
effective rate of depreciati on of.3?o, in continuation of
the deflationary exchange rate policy.
The consequences of this tightening may be illustrated
by the indicative lending rate for 90 day operations (re-
ported by the Portuguese Bank Association) which
jurnped by two percentate points ro 19.4% at the end of
April 1989. It has remained on a rising trend and
reached a level of 23.4% at the end of December 1990.
The growth of the monetary aggregates has calmed down
since then: L- growth dectined to 7.59o by the end of
1989 and has remained at that Ievel until March 1990.
Since then there was a reacceleration (16.5% in August
1990). However, inflation, after recording a peak in the
third quarter of 1989 and again in Ocrober lggl (14,4%)
is not yet in a clearly downward trend (14.1% in Novem-
ber 1990).
However, very substantial capital inllows accentuated in
recent months by increasing speculation about early
entry of the escudo in the ERM have created difficulties
in maintaining the present stance of monetary policy.
These difficulties led the Banco de portugal to impose
from 25 June 1990 onwards, a 90-day ban on term oper-
ations in Escudo in an attempt to stem capital inflows.
In July 1990, new financial borrowing from abroad be-
came subject to a 40% non-interest bearing deposit with
the Banco de Portugal. At the same time outward portfo-
lio investments by Portuguese residents were completely
liberalized in anticipation of the official Community
deadline (31. 12.1990). In an important step to reduce the
attractiveness of domestic interest rates to non-residents,
the Bank of Portugal has allowed greater unpre-
dictabitity for the exchange-rate evolution of the escudo
since the lst October.
2. Towards a market-oriented monetary
policy approach
Due to monetary financing of the budget deficit and to
the absence of well developed money markets, monetary
policy in Portugal was for long based on credit ceilings(with an associated target for the liquidity a1gte3arte,
L-), administered interest rates and a crawling-peg ex-
change-rate policy. Since 1985, monetary policy has
been in transition towards a market-oriented approach :(l) new instruments have been introduced on the money
market; (2) an effort is made to sterilize excess liquidity
which was the result of the monetary financing of the
public debt; (3) interest rates have been progressively
liberalized; (4) and more recenrly compulsory credit
ceilings have been abolished. At the same time por-
tuguese financial markets are becoming increasingly
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integrated internationally and the question arises as to
which exchanSe rate policy should be envisaged in the
near future. This question, which is of course essential
also for the role of monetary policy in stabilizing the
economy, is dealt with in section 4.4.
Potential excess liquidity (the difference between de-
posits and credit quota) of the banking sector has been a
major subject of concern for the Banco de Portugal.
Already in 1976 when the interbank money market was
created and in 1978 when the interbank securities market
was started, efforts were made to drain excess liquidity.
In 1985, the rnoney market was made more flexible and
a new treasury bill was launched as an additional drain-
ing measure. Later in 1987, the central bank issued
monetary certificates with a maturity of I to 7 days for
intervention in the very short end of the money market.
In the same year intervention certificates and time de-
posits to be held at the central bank were introduced to
contribute to the mopping-up of liquidity. However, the
measures taken have not been sufficient to prevent a
continuation of liquidity accumulation in the banking
system. In 1989, great efforts have been made to drain
out excess liquidity from the banking system in order to
prepare a more market-oriented approach of money man-
agement, putting more emphasis on indirect market con-
trol. The most important measures are the increase in
reserve requirements (March 1989), continuing inter-
vention of the Banco de Portugal in the interbank money
market through the maintenance of high rates on long-
term deposits with the Central bank, and intervention in
the interbank securities market, created to absorb short-
term excess liquidity,
lnitially, these measures were successful, but massive
capital inflowsjeopardized the draining efforts. Hence,
the monetary authorities envisaged more moppirrg-up
operations and for the last quarter of 1990 it was plarmed
to issue large amounts of public debt for subscription by
commercial banks who can sell it to the public in order
to (i) reimburse the Banco de Portugal (its holdings of
such debt were the main counterpart of bank's excess
liquidity up to 1988 or 1989; more recently capital in-
flows have been the major contributor to liquidity cre-
ation); (ii) advance repayment of government's and state
owned enterprises'external debt. By reducing the mon-
etary financing via the Central bank, this operation
should contribute to making the financing mechanism of
the budget more transparent.
Complete success would imply an increased explicitly
budgetary cost to the extent that government borrowing
gradually approaches market conditions. Increased cen-
tral bank profit transfers, made possible by the elimina-
tion of highly remunerated deposits at the central bank,
which are used to subscribe to the newly issued public
debt, would help offset that cost. Also, this would lead,
in the long run, to a better functioning of the financial
markets and would help solve the tension between the
desire to keep the cost of public debt service as low as
possible, on the one hand, and to move to market meth-
ods of monetary control, on the other.
In such a framework of excess liquidity and poorly
developed financial markets administratively fixed in-
terest rates and credit ceilings were the most important
instrument of monetary control in Portugal for many
years. The gradual modemization of the financial system
has led to the progressive liberalization of almost all
bank interest rates (crsdit and deposits rates), with the
only exception of the minimum rate for six month de-
posits. In the past, administered interest rates played an
important role as an instrument of monetary manage-
ment, with particular effectiveness in conuolling capital
flight and improving domestic financial savings. It may,
however, have also served as a hidden fiscal policy
instrument seeking revenues by imposing an implicit
intermediation tax on borrowers and depositors of the
banking system. Since March 1990, compulsory credit
ceilings, which discriminated against the productive sec-
tor in favour of the public soctor, have been suspended.
Nevertheless, banks were still asked to keep their credit
expansion in line with a recommended value announced
by the central bank. From 1 January 1991, also this was
abolished.
The move away from quantitative credit restrictions and
from administered interest rates made possible by the
modemization of the financial system implies a major
structural change in the functioning of financial markets
in Portugal. It represents a major improvement, paves
the way for the development of efficient markets and
creates a need for the continuing development of mar-
ket-oriented policy instruments. Nevertheless, further
deregulation in financial markets remains necessary.
Conuary to other member countries the Portuguese legal
tradition requires in general explicit approval of most
innovations, which discourages private initiative,
while at the same time the state alone may be over-
strained to create efficient market structures.
3. Quantity targets and indicators
As capital movements were far from being liberalized,
and financial markets were only loosely related to inter-
national markets the Bank of Portugal had some degree
of freedom to target a liquidity aggregate L-, in spite of
its exchange-rate orientation; more recently its room for
manoeuvre declined substantially. Money markets have,
however, been poorly developed and the information
content of aggregates has been blurred in view of the
large, albeit decreasing, level of regulation.
The Banco de Portugal has constructed a rather broad
aSgreSate L-to mirror potential demand pressure in the
economy. L- includes currency in circulation, demand
deposits, time deposits, foreign curency deposits held
by residents, repos, cash bonds, treasury bills and short-
tenn government securities intermediated by financial
institutions (CLIP) held by the domestic non-financial
private sector. This aggregate, which comprises both
liquid liabilities of the banking system and short-term
govemment securities held by the public, is subject to
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disturbances produced by the development of capital
markets in Portugal.
A main problem with L- is that empirical evidence has
not provided srrong support for the relationship between
the intermediate monetary target and the final objective
of price level stability, with periods of even negative
correlation between L and inflation. Price controls,
which were removed only very recently, may be one
explanation. Another explanation may be found in the
high degree of interest rate regulation and credit ration-
ing in the past, which rendered aggregates irrelevant as
indicators of demand pressure. At the same time, finan-
cial deregulation made the relation between L- and the
final objective less stable.
Further, the credibility of the announcement of targets
as an instrument to influence the formation of expecta-
tions of inflation and exchange rates seerns to be poor
given the ineffectiveness of liquidity rargering in the
small open economy of Portugal. Repeated redefinition
of the aggregate, in order to include developments and
structural changes in the domestic financial market,
which is increasingly being internationalised, does not
strengthen the information content of target an-
nouncements.
A narrower aggregate, more closely linked to the trans-
actions demand for money, such as Ml, has been subject
to a high degree of instability. This is nor surprising,
given the changes in the conduct of monetary policy, the
adjustment of the banking system to credit ceilings and
the other various structural developments in financial
markets.
A more general problem is that targeting a monetary
aggregate is frequently ar odds with the established ob-jective for the effective exchange rate if capital move-
ments cannot be effectively controlled. The problem will
become increasingly important the more capital liberali-
sation is advanced, and once full liberalisatiou is realised
(targeted for 1996 ar the latesr) only domesric credir
would in principle remain controllable.
Given these disadvantages of targeting quantities, the
importance of price indicators of the monetary policy
stance such as the yield curve, asset prices and the
exchange rate may in principle have a more important
role to play. Within the framework of not well developed
and partly administered financial markets, the informa-
tion value ofprice indicators in Portugal has so far been
limited. It may grow in importance as financial markets
are further liberalized and develop; but it is not surpris-
ing that a considerable degree of importance was to be
given to the exchange rate as a targer policy. The fol-
lowing section discusses the benefits and pitfalls of
exchange-rate targeting in more detail.
4. Exchange rate policy and prospects for
an ERM entry of the escudo
In the last few years, inflation differentials between
Portugal and its main trade partners have not been fully
reflected in the announced, monthly depreciation of the
escudo. In particular, after April 1986, the monthly rate
of depreciation was continuously cut down on the basis
of target inflation rates. Since December 1988, how-
ever, a constant depreciation rate of 37o a year was fixed,
after the inflation rate had jumped again to double digit
rates. More recently, ERM-entry became the primary
policy aim.
Developments
The crawling peg exchange-rate policy introduced in
1977 involved a programmed monthly depreciation of
the effective exchange rate against 13 currencies. Its
main purpose until 1985 was to improve or at least
maintain external competitiveness. Over the period
1977 -1985, the real exchange rate, evaluated on the basis
of unit labour costs, declinedby 4OVo, but mainly as a
result of several discrete devaluations.
From April 1986 to December 1988, the crawling peg
was applied on a degressive basis as a function of quar-
terly inflation targets. The rate of depreciation of the
effective exchange rate of the escudo was continuously
cut down from l?o a monrh in 1985 to 0.2?o by the end
of 1988. And from the beginning of 1989, after the
in-flation rate had accelerated again to some l2%o, a
constant monthly depreciation rate of O,25Vo (3Vo per
year) was fixed. This policy has resulted in a 87o real
appreciation ofthe escudo, evaluated on the basis ofunit
labour costs, since April 1986.
On 25 June 1990, the Banco de portugal temporarily
suspended escudo term operations for a 90 day period,
when a massive wave into the escudo put it under strong
appreciation pressure. On I October 1990, the auth-
orities decided to abandon the crawling peg and only
retained the3?o rate ofdepreciation as a long-term pol-
icy objective, although non-binding on a monthly or
even annual basis. In addition the reference basket was
changed. While previously the crawling peg was
measured against a currency basket which also included
the dollar and the yen and represented the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate of the escudo, exchange rate manage-
ment is now evaluated against a currency basket only
composed of ERM-cunencies.
Increased short-term unpredictability was desirable in
order to discourage capital inflows attracted by high
Portuguese interest rates. In the eyes of the portuguese
authorities the policy move could even bring forward
ERM participation because of its probable greater disin-
flationary impact as compared to the previous crawling-
peg regime.
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Assessment
An important turning-point was reached when Portugal
abandoned its policy of competitive devaluation on ac-
cession to the Community. The gradual reduction in the
rates of depreciation has reinforced the impact of exter-
ual disinflation factors.
Unfortunately these factors have been overwhelmed by
other determinants of inflation, leading to an inflation
rate of 12 to I3?o in 1989. As it is typically the case in
boom periods, the increase in profit margins explain a
significant part of the acceleration in prices with real
unit labour costs (or the share of wages in income)
declining. Given the present situation of excess demand
and inflationary pressure, which will be reinforced once
wages start to catch up, a significant real appreciation of
the escudo is necessary to restrain demand for domestic
output in favour of net imports, This real appreciation
may come about through a strong escudo and/or a higher
rate of inflation.
The float. since October 1990 would probably lead to an
appreciation of the escudo, given its high level of inter-
est rates necessary for monetary control and justified by
good profitability conditions and investment oppor-
tunities. An appreciation of the escudo would help re-
duce inflation directly in the short run. It also would be
beneficial in cooling the economy down not only as a
result of the expenditure switch but also as a conse-
quence of the pressure that the currency appreciation
would put on producers' profitability, making them more
reluctant to accept wage claims than in the current con-
text of strong demand and high capacity utilisation le-
vels. And it would offset the impact of higher interesr
rates on investment by reducing prices for imported
capital goods. However if the recent increase in oil
prices turns out to be a permanent real shock, then the
degree of (temporary) real appreciation of the escudo to
be sought after both by the market and Portuguese auth-
orities should be revised downwards.
Prospects
The ERM commitment would probably lead private
economic agents to anticipate a policy mix consistent
with both the exchange-rate stability and the fighting
against inflation. One may expect that strong exchange-
rate discipline would increase the credibility of the econ-
omic authorities, and of monetary policy in particular.
This would contribute to moderate inllati6n expectations
and discipline domestic costs. The more the exchange-
rate commitment is credible and capital movements are
freed, the closer will Portuguese interest rates move
towards other ERM rates. The lowering of the risk
premium would ease the burden of public debt, lower the
cost of bond financing of investment expenditures (off-
set, however, by relatively high prices for imported capi-
tal goods, as compared with a situation in which the
escudo was allowed to float upwards) and would bring
forward consumption expenditures.
It is however, questionable whether the implied increase
in domestic demand would be welcomed at the moment
when demand pressure is already high and the current
account in deficit. In addition, the positive credibility
effects are not likely to be sufficient to bring down
inflation in due time. A combination of tight monetary
and fiscal policies and managed floating would be a
strategy to bring down inflation in preparation for Por-
tugal to enter into the ERM.
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
1. Introduction and summary
Conscious of the handicaps which characterize an unde-
veloped financial system, closed to innovative external
influences and dominated by uncompetitive nationalized
banks, the Portuguese authorities have started to mod-
ernize the financial system. To that end the banking
sector was opened to foreign entrants and capital move-
ments are gradually being liberalized. The philosophy is
that imported competition will make the domestic finan-
cial sector more efficient. This external liberalization
has its domestic counterpart in the privatisation of public
banks, the deregulation of interest rates, the elimination
of credit ceilings and the development of new capital
market institutions and instruments.
If this approach to modernization is to be succesful, there
is not only the need that the institutional reforms take
place without delay but also that the government reduces
its borrowing needs and that inllation is curbed, thus
facilitating respectively the elimination of priviledged
financin'g channels 2and the development of stable long-
term financing instrumens which are determined by
market forces. These additional requirements seem also
necessary in order to be able to continue with the lib-
eralization of capital movements which is likely to be an
important trigger for domestic financial modernization.
2. The banking sector and the financing of
the economy
Until 1984 the Portuguese financial system was domi-
nated by the banting sector comprising 9 domestic com-
mercial banks (nationalized in 1975 following the
Revolution), 3 foreign commercial banks, 2 savings
banks and one investment bank. In that year banking
sector was opened to new entrants, both from domestic
and foreign origin. By 1990 four new domestic and seven
foreign commercial banks were created as well as two
investment banks, one with domestic and one with
foreign capital. At the same time financing through capi-
tal markets (see 3.) was stimulated by the creation of new
financial instruments and non-monetary linancial in-
stitutions. Later in 1988 the green light was given for the
partial privatisation of one of the nine commercial banks
nationaiized in 1975. Complete privatisation was not
possible until the Constitution was amended, which
happened in 1989. More privatisations of banks are
scheduled.
As a consequence of the deregulation measures the bank-
ing sector lost its dominant position in the financing of
the economy as illustrated in table I and2. While in 1985
still 86,77o of the financing of private enterprises oc-
curred through bank credit, it fell to 15,8% in 1988 and
further in 1989 (7,4Vo). The same evolution is observed
in the financing of the general government : over the
same period bank credit fell from 75,97o to 46,69o in
1988 and became negative (net repayment) in 1989.
Tablc l: Flnenclng ol prlvrte enterprlses
(chenge ln flnenclrl llebllltles, % oftolrl)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Domestlc brDk credlt
Fordgncredlt
Dondc + sh.rcs
Credlt ftm no.moetrry
flnam'lal lnstltutlooc
Othc(r)
Totll
OnESIC)
%.7 54.O -20.9 t5.E 7.4
2.3 4.0 24.t 2t.O 32.7
4.4 10.0 33.4 16.5 12.5
4.9 4.0 22.6 16.2 14.3
6.3 28.0 40.8 30.5 33.1
lm r00 100 100 lm
( r 83.6X234.5X294.0X846.
(l) Other financial arer (which include up ro 1985 foreign in-
yestment in Portugal), rrrelnr errors and omissions.
Sourcc: Bank of Ponugal. annual reports.
Table 2: Flnenclng ofgenerel government
(chenge offlnenclel llebllltles, % totel)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Domestlcbankcredlt 75.9 2i.l 26.7 44.5 -29.4
Fordgncredlt 14.2 1.1 9.2 2.E -16.6
Tfeuryblllsendbotds 38.2 87.1 62.1 52.2 142.4
Othcr(l) -2t.4 -12.1 1.9 0.5 3.6
Tdd 100 100 100 lm 100
(bo ESC) (535,3X490,6X67E,7)(67\4)(547,O)
(l)Arrearr
Sowcc: Benk of Portugel, ennuel report.
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Tabel 3: Brd debts (l) rnd reseryes of 3he benklng
system (2)
(% of totel brhnce shc€t, end of pcrlod)
Bad and dorbtful debt Cepltel eod Fecerver
l9El
DA
l9E3
l9E4
l9E5
l9E6
t9g7
1988
r9E9 (3)
5.3
5.5
6.4
6.6
6.4
6.5
6.1
4.0
3.2
3.8
3.9
3.2
3.5
3.4
4.3
5.7
7.4
7.6
(l) Of non-financial (prblic and privare) enterprises and
individuals
(2) Commercial bankr, savings and investment bonks
(3) End of fune
Source: Bank of Portugal, Quarterly Bulletin, March 1990
With the opening of the banking sector and its exposure
to competition, [he suthorities aim at a more efficient
allocation of capital. In addition the developmenr of
capital markets should make the government less de-
pendent on the monetary financing by the banking sec-
tor. This increased competition should allow the banks
to reduce the high share of bad and doubtful debts they
were prone to accumulate in the past (see table 3), Until
1988 the amount of bad and doubtful debts of non-fin-
ancial (public and private) enterprises and individuals
was even larger than the amount of capital and reserves.
The adaptation of the public (now being reprivatised)
commercial banks to a competitive environment, in
which the since 1984 newly created banks occupy a
rapidly growing portion, seems however ro be a difficult
process. In 1989 about 85% of total bank credit was
supplied by the public banks, lo?o by private domestic
banks and 57o by foreign banks established in Portu-
gal.Instead of modernizing the public banks and attack-
ing the problem of the bad debt overhang, which could
be seen as a positive resporuie to the competitive chal-
lenge, a rather defensive attitude is sometimes taken
which led to the inuoduction of additional regulations
on the newcomers in the form of a deposit ceiling and an
increased capital requirement.
3. The development of the capitat markets
In order to make the financing of the economy less
dependent on bank credit, financing through capital mar-
kets is activated by the creation ofnew institutions and
instruments on the one hand, and by the preparation of
the appropriate regulatory framework with a view to
making the capital markets function more efficiently, on
the other hand.
To the new institutions created since 1979 belong leasing
and investment companies designed to provide medium
and long term finance, venture capital companies and a
regional development society. Also institutional inves-
tors, like pension funds and companies for collective
investment in securities, which could contribute in an
important way to the smooth functioning of capital mar-
kets were missing. These have been allowed since 1985.
Among the new instruments issued by the government
or public enterprises are Treasury Bills (maturity up to
one year) created in 1985, which also households could
buy, savings ccrtificates (five year maturity) and partici-
pation bonds (with a part of income linked to profit) both
from 1986.
Financial institutions have been allowed since 1986 to
issue cash certificates (minimum maturity 2 years) on
tap subject to a ceiling and certificates of deposits (ma-
turity between 6 months and five years, minimum
amount of ESC 5 m). In general financing instruments
are issued in the short end of the market or with a floating
interest rate. In 1986 the government experienced with
the issue of a three year fixed interest. bond. Success was
however modest and recently the maturity of fixed inter-
est bonds has even been shortened because ofdifficulties
to suppress inflation.
In order to improve the functioning of capital markets,
the tax reform of 1989 introduced a withholding tax of
257o on capital income and a lo4o tax on capital gains,
thus replacing the old hybrid system giving a different
tax treatment to almost each financial instrument. Also
the stock exchanges of Lisbon and Porto, which were
closed in 1974 following the Revolution and reopened
in 1977 are being modernized. The government plans to
dematerialize securities, link electronically the two
stock exchanges, replace the individual brokers by se-
curity houses and improve the clearing and settlement
system. In addition, the intention is to reduce the high
volume of listed securities traded outside the stock ex-
change (see table 4). Laws to regulate insider trading and
take-over-bids are also in preparation.
Table 4: Structurel detr lor tle s3ock exchenges ol
Llsbon end Porto ln 19E9
(olflchl end unofllclel mrrkei)
Sccrrltles llced 194 287
Capetelhatbn of sccurltles
ESIC blllloo
% domestlcGDP
2966
42
ll50
16.3
Volume of transac{lons
on the stodr excbange
ESC bllllon
% capltallzatloo
outCde the stock exchange
ESC bllllon
3m
l0
t23
10.7
497
Source: Bank of Portugal, Annual Rcporr and Monthly Bulletin
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Table 5:Sevlngs of households
(change of finenclel rssets, 9b of totel)
Currency, demand
depclts
Tlme, savlng$ 662
emlgrants'depclts
Treasury bllls
Bond.s + shares
Other
Total
(bnBSC)
16.5 25.6 14.2 13.6
38.9 36.3 50.9 49.6
6.9 203 15.9
7.3 9.5 22.E
3.1 4.1 5.9
8.2 -3.7
2t.o
6.3
lm 100 100 100 lm
(890.8) (E8l.E) (929.s) (977.9\1 l 19. r)
Report
As a consequence of the development of the capital
market not only the financing of the economy became
less dependent on bank credit (see table I and 2), but also
households diversified their portfolio (see table 5). In
1985 more than 807o of savings accumulated during the
year were held with banks. This fell to 64,57o in 1988
and 55,24o in 1989.
4. The liberalization of capital movements
The deregulation of the domestic financial sector goes
alongside with the gradual removal of capital controls.
The removal of these controls has not been symmetric :
inward capital flows are almost totally free whereas
substantial restrictions apply to the outflow of, mainly,
short-term capital. The acquisition of domestic se-
curities by non-residents was liberalized in January 1986
when Portugal joined the EEC. Inward direct investment
was liberalized on 1.1.1990 by abolishing the ceiling
(gradually increased since the date of Accession) to
which it was subjected. It must however be noted that
foreign ownership of reprivatised firms is restricted to
l07o of. share capital.
Outward portfolio investment has been liberalized in
several steps starting in January 1989 with institutional
investors which could invest 57o or loio (depending on
the type of institution) of their portfolio in foreign assets.
Subsequently, this was increased to 20?o. Private indi-
viduals could buy up to 4 million escudo of foreign
assets in September 1989, which was increased to
l0 million escudo in April 1990. On 1.7.1990 outward
portfolio investment was completely liberalized in an-
ticipation of the ECdeadline (31.12.1990). At the same
time, however, a 4O?o interest free deposit has been
introduced on external borrowing in order to hamper the
inflationary upbuilding through capital inflows (see
table 6). Indeed, the capital account records a growing
surplus (almost 10% of GDP in 1989) to which not only
inward dircct and financial investments contributed but
also the reversal of short-term capital flows in
1985/1986. This recourse to a quantitative measure
(which does not entirely rely on market forces) to curb
the mounting inflationary pressure, further illustrates the
difficulty of Portugal to cope with external liberaliza-
tion. Also the limitation of foreign ownership of dena-
tionalized firms can be interpreted in this sense.
In the present macro economic circumstances capital
outflows seem to be more easily to liberalize than the
inllows and it is then also expected that the EC-obliga-
tion to eliminate certain restrictions on some personal
capital movements by the end of the year will not create
problems. This must however not disguise the fragility
of the external opening of capital markets if the appro-
priate domestic policy response concentrating on better
government finances and a reduction of inflation is not
put into operation. Restrictions on the opening of deposit
accounts, on financial loans and credits, outward direct
investment and outward real estate operations may be
kept until 31.12.1992, some of those even until
31.12.1995 subject to an authorization procedure at the
European Community.
Trble 5:The non-moretry crpltel rccount of the
bdence of pryments (mllllon USD)
Yar Extcrrrrl crcdits Noa-dcbt crpitelflox
;ffit t ililf,67i-6iil- epirrl 6mr
diud tm
loat
diun/ tm @ut r@ul
lmr (l) (Pn)
l9r3 1370 -59t 779
1984 r23t -199 1039
1985 gfi -nr ffi
1986 -5t6-t245 -176t
1987 -561 &5 84
1988 -88 r73 15
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ttt2 -625
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(1) Including leads and lagr, errors and omissions
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Source: Bank of Ponugal, Annual Reports end Monthly
Bulletin.
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CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Public investment needs
Several factors, apart from the relatively low GDP level,
explain the lack of investment capacity of the Portuguese
government in the past decades: insufficient develop-
ment of taxation, the cost of African wars, the post-1974
pressures on public finance. The resulting underinvest-
ment in public infrastructure meant that it became insuf-
ficient to serve the growing and congested areas of the
western strip, while the hinterland were virtually cut off
from any development opportunities and communica-
tions with the rest of Europe remained inadequate, ag-
gravating the peripheral situation of the country. A study
of the infrastructure endownments in European countries
carried out for the Commission in the early 1980's shows
Portugal to be at the bottom of the EC league in terms of
a comprehensive indicator of economic and social infra-
structure,
In terms of human capital the country is also in an
unfavourable position relatively to its EC partners: a
quarter of the active population is still in the agricultural
sector and another large fraction in the traditional low-
productivity industries. The overall level of qualifica-
tion is admittedly very low: in 1987/88, 20Vo of young
people leaving school did so with the legal minimum of
9 years and another 307o with less than that. Within the
present active popul ation 7 57o had at most attended the
basic school level (initially 4 years and until recently,6
years). Job-oriented education has just begun to be de-
veloped, and the percentage of highly specialized wor-
kers in Portuguese firms is only about 57o.
Portuguese industry in the Single European
Market
In the light of the preceeding considerations on human
capital, it comes as no surprise that the country's indus-
trial structure and in particular its exports, rely chiefly
on low labour costs (in 1984, one industrial man-hour
cost in Portugal 2.3 ECU, in Greece 4 ECU, in Italy 10.4
ECU and in West Germany 14. l). The moderation of real
wage increases in the past has allowed the maintenance
of wage differentials, but closer integration within the
EEC and EMU can only help to erode that advantage.
The Portuguese manufacturing sector relies strongly on
low-technology, labour intensive consumption goods.
Food products, wood, paper, textile and clothing repre-
sent some two thirds of exports. The pattern of trade with
the rest of the EC shows mainly an inter-sectoral kind of
specialization, although with a tendency to move to-
wards intra-sectoral exchanges in non-traditional sec-
tors. The impact of the single market upon these trends
is very difficult to predict, although it is expected to lead
to a deterioration of the balance of trade and to extensive
restructuring of import-competing industries. The over-
all pattern of specialization of the Portuguese industry is
not expected to change overnight, neither is a massive
re-location of manufacturing towards the South of Eu-
rope as consequences of the single market.
The diversification of the Portuguese industrial fabric
and inter-sectoral linkages are relatively weak, with
moreover a marked dualism of structures which is not
apparent from most statistics. Despite the optimism
shown in a 1987 EC survey of entrepreneurs, the ma-
jority of Portuguese firms do not have the productive or
managerial structures to enable them to take any advant-
age of the European Single Market. A number of 'mod-
ern'industries, mainly in the state-owned sector, also
lack competitivity and their future may be problematic.
In another Commission survey, in 1989, Portuguese in-
dustrialists emphasised the need for restructuring at the
level ofproduction processes, rather than in the fields of
product, marketing, distribution or international cooper-
ation. This suggests that structural adjustment and prep-
arations for 1992 are still at a compiuatively early stage.
In the long term, Portugal is looking for a way to con-
solidate its external position in a durable basis by, inter
alia, building an industrial basis with a different pattern
of specialization more oriented towards equipment and
higher technology goods (see the objectives of PEDIP).
With the country more and more strongly integrated into
the single European market and economic and monetary
union, which in turn will become more open to new
industrialized competitors, it will be more and more
difficult to maintain a comparative advantage based ex-
clusively on low wage costs. That emphasises the need
for microeconomic policies aimed at reinforcing compe-
titivity.
On the other hand, international trade is less and less
often carried out in a framework of perfect competition
where the cost element is dominant. An increasing part
of trade takes place within multinational firms or groups,
and much of the rest is determined in a complex oligo-
polistic framework involving products, technologies and
marketing, where again multinationals play a decisive
role. Few Portuguese firms will have the ability to play
this game on their own, and therefore international con-
nections, which are reflected in the surge of foreign
direct investment (cf. below) are welcome and indeed
necessary.
Structural support from the EC
The Community Support Framework (CSF) for Portugal,
1989-1993 established, according to the reform of the
EC structural funds on the basis of a S-year regional
development plan, marked a substantial increase in the
investment effort of the Community funds and the na-
tional government. The Community will more than
double its transfers to Portugal, by L993, with respect to
1988, reaching some 3.5Vo of Portuguese GDP. On the
Portuguese side, the investment expenditure by the Gov-
ernmenl will be 30%4OVo higher in the 1989-1993 peri-
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od than the -already considerable - 1988 level. The
country is classified as a whole within objective I of the
structural funds (development of lagging regions) and
benefits therefore from the maximum intensity of Com-
munity aid: up to 70% of eligible public expenditure. It
benefits furthermore from Community Support under
objectives 3,4 and 5a) - combating long-term unemploy-
ment, occupational integration of young people and ad-justment of agricultural structures.
The CSF covers 13.6 billion ECU of public expenditure
over the five years, and two main priorities are the
economic infrastructrure and human resources, with a
particular reinforcement of the latter and the extension
of Community aid to the general schooling system. The
magnitudes of spending in the main categories of the
CSF are given in Table l.
Infrastructure investment accounts for more than l/3 of
the CSF spending, if one considers the infrasructure
components of agriculture and regional programmes.
Within that, about 2/3 respects to road transport, where
7o_9o-807o of the planned national nerwork (including
150 KM of mororways) should be completed by 1993.Following in importance, works on the existing and rundown railway network (not expansion) will improve
mainly the international links, the Lisbon-porto axis and
the service around these two urban areas. ports and
airports in Lisbon and Porto will also benefit from the
CSF. A glance at the distribution of spending among the
different projects and regions is quite revealing: em-
phasis has been put in serving the main economic and
demographic agglomerations, and in attenuating the pe_
ripheral situation of the country as a whole, more than e.
g. serving remote areas or attempting to 'decentralize,
away from the congested regions.
As regards the manpower axes of the CSF, the financial
resources charurelled by the ESF into professional train-
ing (over 300 MECU per year) set off a revolurion in a
field that had remained dormant in Portugal for more
than l0 years. In the period prior to the adoption of the
CSF, there was a proliferation of small training schemes
that ensured the utilization of ESF resources but offered
few guarantees in the way ofconsistency, cost efficiency
and adequacy to the needs of the labour market. With the
CSF, manpower measures were structured into 4 main
vectors - education, vocational training structures, ap_
prenticeships and multi-sectoral training - and emphasis
has shifted to the support of the official education and
training systems, with a more centralized management.
Together with objectives 3 and 4, the contribution of the
EC towards these actions will amount to some 2200
MECU over rhe 5 years.
By its comprehensive nature and by the volume of re-
sources deployed, the CSFrepresents therefore an unpre_
cedented development effort in the country, and will no
doubt conuibute significantly to the convergence be_
tween Portugal and the Community provided that a mac-
roeconomic strategy be implemented to ensure a context
of stable growth.
Private investment, incentives and
industrial poticy
After Germany, Portugal is the EC country with the
highest share of manufacturing in GDp. Given present
trends and the characteristcs of the economy - labour
force, import dependence etc. - it is expected that manu-
facturing will continue to have a leading role in the
country's economic growth. With the increase in corpor_
ate profitability, EC integration and the provision of
generous financial incentives (see below), private in_
vestment has boomed in Portugal since 19g7. lnvestment
in the manufacturing sector represents more thtn 407o of
gross fixed capital formation. The present challenge is
how keep a high investmenr rate without impairing its
efficient allocation and marginal productivity:
Subsidization of private invesrment, mainly in industry,
will amount ro about 2 billion ECU in the period l9g9_
1993. That parr of the CSF has rwo main tomponents:
the PNCIAB a regionally-based incentive scheme for
industry and tourism, and the pEDIp (Specific pro_
Srarnme for the development of the portuguese industry)
a medium-term prograrnme for the creation of an export_
based indusuial base. Together, they imply an average
subsidy rate of about 4O7o of the investment involvid
and a de facto absence of a regional selectivity of aid(the PEDIP covers Lisbon and porro, excluded by the
PNIACP). Whatever the results of these schemes, the
costs in terms of allocative efficiency and public finance
will therefore be considerable. Being elements of a vol-
Trble 1: Composltlon of the CSF for Portugrl,
19re.l9e3 (MEcu)
Nrtiourl
tovmB@l
Stncolnl lbtd
6Ed, prbtic
Infrastructure
(% oftotal)
lnvcstment ald
Agrlculture
Manpower
Reglooal programtDcs
Other
2495.0
175%
901.9
13.5%
495.6
7.4%
1731.4
2,r..O%
t022.o
15.4%
t2.o
o.2%
r339.0
19.2%
l,l8l.O
20.1%
116t.0
15.9%
2t97.O
29.8%
I16r.0
15.8%
22.O
o.3%
3834.0
28.2%
238L9
14.5%
1663.0
12.2%
3928.4
28.9%
2t83.2
t6.M
34.0
0.2%
Total
(% ofGDP)
6658.1
2.9%
7368.0 1fi25.t
3.3% 6.2%
Source: EC Commission, CSF for portugal, 19g9-1993
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untarist policy of industrial development, it is important
that those subsidies are not allowed to have negative
distortionary effects upon the investment pattern in in-
dustry leading to excessive capital deepening or lower
marginal productivity of capital. A positive element to
be considered is the increased discipline exerted by the
Commission upon state aids in other Community coun-
tries; that should allow more significant results for ge-
nuine development policies at any given rate of subsidy.
The PEDIP is, however, more than an incentive scheme
to private investment. It is a strategic programme which
involves from the part of the Community a contribution
of I bn ECU: 500 MECU from the structural funds and
500 MECU from a special budget line and to be com-
mitted between 1988 and 1992. Its 4 axes aim at improv-
ing, with Community support, the financial,
technological and infrastructural bottlenecks faced by
the manufacturing sector.
The PEDIP illustrates the Porruguese authorities'strong
committment to the modernization and diversification of
the industrial fabric. In the past traditional sectors like
textile, food etc. have led 8 process of mainly inter-sec-
toral specialization. These industries are showing some
loss of competitiveness, especially vis-a-vis the new
industrialized countries and their furure of those sectors
rests on upgrading and renewed marketing strategies.
Other sectors are emerging which may eventually re-
place them: metalic and electric products, transport
equipment, ceramics, glass. These sectors are charac-
terized by a high degree of intra-industry and intra-firm
trade and by the important role of transnational invest-
ment.
Foreign direct investment
After remaining at r very low level between 1974 and
1986, foreign direct investment in Portugal showed a
spectacular growth in 1988 and 1989. This is attribured
to increased confidence due to the country's current
political and economic stability, and the new oppor-
tunities opened by EC membership. In fact, very large
increases are registered in investments originating in
the EC, particularly those from Spain.
These foreign investment flows together with real estate
and portfolio investment and other long-run capital in-
flows, contributed to the much improved balance of
payments situation, which allowed the authorities to
accelerate the repalmlent of external public debt after
1985. They currently represent some I l% of gross fixed
capital formation in the country. If one considers the
capital component of the structural funds, which repre-
sents a similar amount, the country is benefiting from a
substantial addition (20-25%) to domestic savings in the
financing of its investment needs. The permanence of
such favourable conditions cannot be taken for granted,
and it is therefore important that those cards be correctly
played preferably before a the temporary derogations to
EC rules, negotiated with accession, expire by the end
of 1992. As far as foreign investment, a protective atti-
tude, such as in the past, is not desirable (or admissible
within the EC). But there would be an active policy of
attracting the type of investment that the country can
most benefit from i.e. that with a reasonable technologi-
cal content, qualified labour requirements and involve-
ment of the domestic sector.
It seems useful to look at the sectoral composition of the
recent surge in foreign investment:
As the table shows, the growth has been mostly in the
service sectors while manufacturing accounts only for
26% of the total. The financial sector (branches of
foreign banks) had a particularly large weight. Within
manufacturing, the largest growth has not been in the
machinery electronics and transport equipment that ex-
perienced considcrable development in the first half of
the 1980's but rather in the resource-based industries
(sea, forestry, minerals) and in the traditional exporting
sectors (textile, clothing).
Connected with the trend away from the manufacturing
sectors, the percentage of projects oriented towards ex-
port markets is smaller than the one of projects aimed at
the domestic market. Finally, the takeover of Portuguese
Iirms has gained importance, as a form of foreign invest-
ment, relative to the reinforcement of capital in existing
firms with foreign participation. These qualitative fea-
nrres are a major aspect to be taken into account when
assessing the recent foreign investment boom.
The perspectives for foreign direct investment remain
positive for 1990, and it is expected that in the sub-
sequent years they will be helped by the PEDIP and other
incentives, and by the incoming privatisations. Also, the
authorities expect to attract foreign investment into sec-
tors of strategic interest for the country's industrial pol-
icy. Recent announcements by American and
Japanese car manufacturers are encouraging in this
Tablc 2: Compocltlon for lorelgo direcl lnvestment,
r9r?.re (MEcu)
1989 1987-89
Agrlc, forc.t, [sh.
Extrectlvelodudrles
Menuleclurlng
Energy
Bulldlng
Tre&endtoorlsm
Trampat
Banks and lnsurence
Othcrservlcec
ll.7 20.2 18.0 2.o%
9.9 12.0 18.0 1.7%
93.7 1833 234.6 22.6%
0.0 0.3 t.2 0.1%
3.6 24.t 70.5 5.r%
59.7 99.4 3t5.2 22.3%
ll.4 4.6 12.3 t.t%
124.9 t97.7 5@.0 42.2%
2.4 13.5 32.6 2.8%
317.1 555.0 t?SL6 100.0%
Sourcc: Bank of Ponugal
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respect; on the other hand, the suddenly increased com-
petition from Eastern European countries with close
links with the EC may have an adverse influence on
foreign direct investment.
Microeconomic policies
The public and private investment efforts are but one
aspect of the catching up process of the Portuguese
economy. A comprehensive and credible reform of the
operating environment of economic agents is another. [n
both, EC membership plays an important role: by posi-
tively shaping agents expectations, helping to finance
that investment effort and by pointing the right way for
the desirable policy regime changes. Some aspects of
microeconomic economic policy are vital, and some will
become increasingly important with the movement to-
wards EMU: privatization, labour market, financial mar-
kets and taxation.
The privatization process, started in 1989 and expected
to last until 1992, will have an important impact on the
Portuguese industrial and banking sectors. At present,
the non-bank public sector accounts for some 15% of
GDB while public-owned hold a dominanr position in
the financial sector. The economic performance of the
nationalized sector (since nationalization in 1975) has
been very poor, and privatisation is expected to bring
about substantial improvements in the supply side of the
economy, despite the fact that some of the public enter-
prises (e.g. heavy industry) may remain problem sectors.
With registered unemployment at around 5?o , the por-
tuguese economy seems to be drawing close to full em-
ployment. This figure, however, does not reflect existing
underempolyment, mainly due to the backwardness of
the agricultural sector and the lack of manpower mo-
bility in industry and services resulting from a tradition
of protected employment. The Portuguese labour market
is governed by a very restrictive legislation, inherited
from the 1970's. The private sector has been able to
circumvent this problem by resorting to temporary con-
tracts, which account for some'751o of new hirings. This
dualistic structure is neither appropriate to an efficient
balance between firms' competitiveness and workers'
welfare, nor to the investment in human capital which is
favoured by a context of stable employment relation-
ships.
Privatization of the large state banks, followed by the
extemal opening of the financial sector and eventualy
EMU, is expected to lead to extensive restructuring of
this sector. The number of financial institutions is ex-
cessive for the size of the domestic market, and by their
dimension product range etc. they are not deemed to be
internationally competitive. Apart from the consequen-
ces upon the banking sector itself, liberalized financial
markets will have profound implications for budgetary
policy (through the cosr of the public debt), monetary
policy (now switching from direct controls to market-
oriented instruments) and for the rest of the economy,
whose financing still rests almost exclusively on the
banking sector.
Finally, there is one domain of structural reform with
suategic importance for the whole process: taxation. The
reform of the tax system was initiated with the introduc-
tion of VAT in 1986, and pursued in I 989 wirh the reform
of direct taxation with a single income tax. These new
taxes replaced a number of inefficient and overlapping
taxes and are expected to result in lower distortions
while providing extra resources for the development of
the country and the improvement of public finance.
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Background Papers
This country study draws on the following papers and
documents:
. "Medium term fiscal adjustment for Portugal", by
Henning Christophersen
. "Contribution towards a Multi-Annual Fiscal Adjust-
ment Strategy (Mafas) for Portugal", rePort requested
by the Portuguese Minister of Finance. Directorate
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Com-
mission of the European Communities, 1990, forth-
coming in Portugal and the Transition to Economic
and Monetary Union. Proceedings of an International
Seminar held in Lisbon, June 1990.
. "One market, one money. An evaluation of the poten-
tial benefits and costs of forming an economic and
monetary union". European Economy, No 44, October
1990, Commission of the European Communities.
. "Social Europe. The impact of the internal market by
industrial sector: the challenge for the member States".
European Fconomy. special edition 1990, Com-
mission of the European Communities.
. Unity with diversity in the European economy: the
Communities Southern frontier. edited by Christopher
Bliss and Jorge Braga de Macedo, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1990, results of a project of the Center for
Economic Policy Research sponsored by the Com-
mission of the European Communities.
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Table l: Maln economlc lndlcators
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Table 2: R.eal growth rates and contrlbutlons to GDP growth
1980 l98l 1982 1983 1984 1985 1916 1987 l98r 1989 1990 l99l t992
Prlvate coosumptlon (a)
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3.6 3.7 0.1 0.1 7.2 4.9 5.3 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.5
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Sourcc: Eurorut
(a) Ycarly growth ratcs
(b) Percentage change over previous year GDP.
(c) Commirsion Forecasts October-Novcmber 1990.
Table 3: Labour market lndlcators: labour force, employment, unemployment
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 r99O (3) l99l (3) t992(3)
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tloo)
o.7
43.6
0.7
43.6
0.4
43.9
o.2 o.2 0.2
45.4
0.2 0.2
45.7 45.944.4 u.9
Total employment (% change p.a.) (1)
Wege and salara eerneny'total employ-
ment(%)
Perentage of llxed-term cutrecls
-0.1
7t.4
13.2
0.6 2.7
71.8
t7.6
2.9 2.3 1.9 0.3 0.5
72.2
l5.E
7L8 73.6
19.2 l9.l
Unemployment rate (2) 8.8 8.2 6.8 5.6 5.0 4.4 4.9 5.0
(l) Nationel surveys(2) SOEC comparible definition.(3) Commirsidr Forecarts October-Novcmber I 990.
Sourcc: I.N.E. cxccpt (2)
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Table 4: Composltlon of the CStr'for Portugel, 19t9 - f 993 (MECU)
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Table 5: Balance of payments (as % oI GDP ln ECU)
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Table 5: Prlces (yearly changes, 96)
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17.6 ?fr.1
18.5 l9.t
25.6 l8.l
75.1 28.9
33.9 21.2
25.8 28.5
u$ u.7
30.0 30.2
29.9 31.2
19.0 l3.l
16.9 to.6
19.4 13.8
21.7 20.5
t7.6 4.5
13.0 {.E
to.2 9.7
t.9 ll.7
10.0 10.0
tt.z ll.5
11.4 t.9
tL6 11.5
t2.7 13.6
u.6 13.7
lz8 13.2 t2.6 11.0
12.5 13.9 12.6 ll.7
7.3 7.3 8.3 7.6
8.0 7.2 8.6 5.1
25.2
31.3
Sourcct Eurostat
(l) Cqnmission Forecasts October-November 1990
Table 7: Wages, productlvlty rnd terms of trade (ycerly growth retes'96)
1980 1981 lg82 l9S3 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990b 1991b 1992b
Nomlnal wegedemployee (a)
Real wages (CPI def.)
Realwagea (GDPdef.)
25.6 zt.O 21.5 21.8 21.3 tL4 21.6 17.9 13.4
3.3 0.7 1.0 -3.2 -5.6 2.5 6.9 7.2 3.1
3.9 2.9 0.7 -2.2 -2.7 0.6 0.9 5.0 1.6
13.0
0.2
0.4
16.9 15.6 13.7
3.3 2.7 2.4
L6 2.7 1.8
Produc'tlvlty ln the cconomY
(GDP/totaleryloymeat)
Labanr cods per unlt ptodwed
(total ecouomy)
Real labour cods per unlt pro-
duced (tdel economy, GDP def.)
4.9 0.6 4.1 1.0 -0.4 2.t 7.O 4.8
19.7 2As rc.1 N.6 2r.8 l9.l 13.6 tz,s
-1.0 2.3 -3.3 -3.2 -2.4 -2.2 -5.7 1.2 -2.1
3.8
9.3
3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5
9.1 r3.0 12.3 9.8
-3.0 -0.8 -0.3 -1.7
Term oftrade (goods and ser-
vlces) -4.6 -5.6 1.4 0.1 4.7 4.0 l2.l -1.0 -2.4 -0.6 0.1 4.2 1.4
(a) National account! dcfinition
(b) Commission Forecrsts Octobcr-Novembcr 1990.
Sorcc:Commiuion rcrvicer
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l9T3 1974 1975 1976 Dn lnt 1979 lgto l98l t9u 1983 l9E4 1985 19E6 t9&I lgrr 1989 l99o tggt t9y2
(r) (D (D O,
Table 8: Portugal - developments of general goverment recelpts and expendltures
(as percentage of GDP)
TAXESTOTAL
INDIRECTTAXES
DIRECTTAXES
SOCIAL SECURITY CON.
TRIBUIION
OT}IER CUNN,ENT N,F-
CEIPTS
TOTALCURRENTNF-
CEIPTS
CI'RR,ENTTR.ANStrERII
TOENTERPRISES
TOHOUSEHOLI'S
OTHER
ACTUAL INTEN,EST PAY.
MENTS
PUBLIC CONST'MPTION
COMPENSATIONOF
EMPLOYEES
PURCHASES ANDOTTIER
TOTAL CUN,NENT EXPEF{.
DITUN,B
EXCLUDINGINTERESTS
PAID
15.9t 16.10 16.3t 1t.57 l9.qt 1t.37 1t522f-4t2t.75 2t.tr u.M B.45ZL46tLgr 21.29 23.62U.4t 231r U.ts U..U
It.o6 ll.l4 ll.(D13.01 l3.o?rln 11.92 14.(E t4.al4.t51556t5.r5 14.12 16.50 t5.35t6.2415.54 15.(r ts.c4t5.!2
4.92 4.96 5.% 5.6 6.00 6.10 6.60 6.3t 751 7.66 S52 S.30 t.34 6.40 5.95 7.38 t.93 t.65 g.3t 9.52
6Jl 6.92 9.63 9.5t 9.79 9.32 t.96 9.D 957 10.15 10.49 9.91 9.67 ll.0l ll.ll 114? rr.2t ttAT 11.49 11.35
l.r9 1.63 1.35 L25 r.7r t.Tt 2.8 tfi l.@ 1.43 L48 t.m L?5 ?.4 3.S0 253 L8g 2,tg 2,t2 t.gg
?AstU.gn.fi 30.51 3054?9.46?,?2yi.353L4t33.3937.05y573?.3937.31 Xi.2t37.61 tt.57x7.37 3?.963S.lt
6.t2 t.51 lLlS l6i3 15.05 15.14 13.9t 15.45 t6.47 tt.D, tg:B m.54 t6.E r6.y ts.gt 14.9414.9t 15.45 t5.66 1559
t.N Lm 1.96 3.63 319 45t 4.08 4.t5 551 5.64 6.90 7.56 4.n 3J2 L15 t.6 1.62 t.47 1.30 l.2l
0.43 0.45 0.72 l.0r t:t2 L6t 2"tt 3.13 s.r3 5.4 5.3t ?.09 7.89 9.X2 1.tr 7:t5 7.26 5.58 r.65 t.2l
tlgt 14.29 15.17 14.01 14.04 13.93 14.21 l4.g 15.05 t4.9215.t4 t5.03 1552 t5.36 t'.N r5.gg 15.72 t5.7615.80 15.61
b.23 23.3ti23.U2 3l.tl 30.t0 31.75 31.u, 33.1236.65 !t.@ 4r.E 4L65 39.65 4.92 3r.92 3t.69 37.96 39.79 &.tt 39.4r
tg.to2ilgt n.n 10.74 D.@ Xr.fi zt.X29.99 !t5233.r5 y.t1 t556 il.77 3t.70 3l.l I 30.93 30.70 !.m 3t.& !.m
CAPTTALEXPENDITUnE L7t L70 3.41 455 4.!9 4.63 4:n .t32 5.(x 5.15 4.U 3.gt t.t2 3.a 4il 4.32 4.3t t54 !.4t 3.47
CAPITALTRANSTERGET)0.53 O.42 O.72 l.{t t.3t t.35 Lfr,-t/$ O.rr 1.75 r:/g t.to r.r4 t.ut 1.45 1.38 r.a 0.76 0.61 0.57
GROSSINVESTMENT L25 LD L69 t.Og 3.01 32t 3.?0 4.15 4.x2 3.n 3.O5 L6r L4t 257 L6 Lg4 Ln Ln 2t0 2,to
TOTALEXPENDITURE
BALANCE
GROSSSAVINGS
PRIMMARYBALANCE
B.Uz 2l;.06 31.4t X.?7 35.19 :]6.3t 35.t4 24.t1 41.6t 43.75 4.rO 46.56 4t.{t 4/'56 4t.U 43.01 42:tt 43.!! 43.52 42.tt
1.56 't.42 -4.(r -5.t6 4.65 -6.93 -6.12 6.a -g.n-rc.% -9.05-lz0Gl0.G -725 -6.83 -s.39 -3.76 -5.95 -5.56 -4.?0
4.Y l-28 -0.65 -1.31 -o.n -L3o -r.36 -Ln 4.?A -52t -4.21 -t.Ot -6.2b -1.6t -2:t2 -t.a 0.6r -2.42 -2.15 -1.23
L9 -O.n -t.v 4.?t -2.94 -4.25 -3.25 9.18 4.r4 4.91 -L6t 4.9t -Lm 1.97 o.gt 2.36 3.49 2.63 3.08 3.51
(l) - Commission crtimatiqrr
(2) - Commisriqr forecests October-November 1990
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Tabel 9: Credlt and monetary aggregates (annual percentage change)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 r.)
L (decJdcc.)
L-x
Ml.tt
20.4 n.7 27.3 22.4
16.8 U.8 285 26.3
8.7 15.9 2l.9 36.1
t4.2
17.5
r4.5
14.5
15.0
12.8
9.5
7.5
6.1
14.9
16.3
l7.E
Total credlt (domedlc + exteroal)
Total domestlccredlt
-togenerd goveroment
-to non-llnandal publlc eotreplses
-to prlvete eiterprlses end househoHs+NMF|
19.0 2L3 19.8 r3.t ll.0 tt.2 3.1 I r.7
22.6 23.8
23.4 29.t
35.6 33.0
It.3 17.4
19.9 22.4
n3 3t.6
19.9 30.4
15.6 13.4
ll.8 ll.9
26.1 18.8
-3.2 4.7
7.9 ll.5
1.6 14.8
-2.9 5.9
-3.1
tt.2
RATIOS (annual evemges)
L./GDP
L-l real GDP
L-lprtceGDP
6.1 2.0
17.0 n.2
4.3 0.1
2.7 0.7
25.O 21.3
5.6 4.8
0.3 -0.8
il.6 10.7
5-7 3.0
(b)
-9.3 -4.8
2.0 8.4
-4.4 4.7
On rhc basis of concclcd lggrcgltcr
(a) September 190
(b) Commirsion rtrfr forecrsr, Octobcr-Novembcr 1990.
Sourcc :Banco & Portugal
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PORTUGAL
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